Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback Reports of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

  Download original PDF

Day v Trust Territory [1963] TTLawRp 17; 2 TTR 421 (16 April 1963)

TRIAL DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT

MARSHALL ISLANDS DISTRICT

Criminal Case No. 40

JOHN DAY

Appellant

v

TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Appellee

April 16, 1963

Defendant was convicted in Marshall Islands District Court of reckless driving, driving with defective brakes, and driving with expired license, in violation of T.T.C., Sees. 815(b), 813(b) and 812(a). On appeal, the Trial Division of the High Court, Associate Justice Paul F. Kinnare, held that mere negligence is insufficient to constitute offense of reckless driving; that knowledge of defective brakes is not essential element of offense of driving 'with faulty brakes; and that defendant acted within definition of statute that valid driver's license issued by driver's country and in his possession meets licensing requirements.

Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

1. Reckless Driving-Negligence

Ordinarily something more than mere negligence in operation of auto-mobile is necessary to constitute offense of reckless driving. (T.T.C., Sec. 815(b) (2) )

2. Reckless Driving-Generally

Under terms of statute or ordinance, reckless driving generally denotes operation of automobile under such circumstances as to show willful or reckless disregard of consequences. (T.T.C., Sec. 815(b) (2) )

3. Motor Vehicles-Brakes

Neither intent to violate law nor knowledge of defective brakes is essential element of offense of driving with faulty brakes, and court must only determine whether or not defendant operated vehicle with defective brakes. (T.T.C., Sec. 813(b) )

4. Criminal Law-Strict Liability

Legislature may declare an act criminal irrespective of intent or knowledge of one who acts, and question then becomes whether defendant did forbidden act.

5. Torts-Negligence

Even in civil actions, one cannot be held responsible on theory of negligence for injury from act or omission, unless he is reasonably chargeable with knowledge that act or omission involved danger to another.

6. Reckless Driving-Negligence

Rule in some jurisdictions that violation of statute is negligence per se is not applicable in criminal prosecution for reckless driving, since issue of contributory negligence is not involved. (T.T.C., Sec. 815(b) (2) )

7. Residence-Generally

In construction of legislation using term "residence," courts look primarily to legislative purpose as well as to context.

8. Residence-Generally

"Residence" may mean something from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.

9. Residence-Generally

When "residence" is used to denote something more than mere physical presence, intent is material.

10. Residence-Generally

Terms "domicile" and "residence", although often used synonomously, are more frequently held not to be convertible, and have been distinguished.

11. Residence-Generally

Whether "residence" and "domicile" are synonymous depends on purpose and intent with which word is used, including context in which it is employed.

12. Motor Vehicles-Operator's License

American employee of Trust Territory is "non-resident" within meaning of statute permitting such persons to drive motor vehicles upon highways of Trust Territory under authority of license from home state when it is in his immediate possession. (T.T.C., Sec. 812 (b) )

KINNARE, Associate Justice

Appellant, an American employee of the Trust Territory, pleaded not guilty in the District Court to charges of Reckless Driving (T.T.C., Sec. 815b), Driving with Defective Brakes (T.T.C., Sec. 813b), and Driving with Expired License (T.T.C., Sec. 812a et seq.). This appeal is from the judgment" finding him guilty on all three counts, fining him $10.00, and prohibiting him from operating any vehicle for a period of three months from the date of the judgment. Appellant contends the evidence offered at the trial was not sufficient to support the findings.

When appeal came on for bearing, it appeared the record of trial was incomplete in that there was no transcript of the testimony offered by either side, nor was there even a summary of such testimony. The court suggested to both sides that they prepare a summary of the testimony offered at the trial, but both sides requested that they be allowed to recall their witnesses. The case was therefore tried de novo.

FACTS

On the afternoon of January 4, 1963, the appellant was driving a flat bed truck (a Trust Territory vehicle) and ran into a pole supporting electric wires in front of the Administration Building. The Sheriff, who was in the building at the time, heard the noise and came out, observing that the bumper of the truck was still against the pole, which had been forced over to a sharply leaning position.

The appellant told the Sheriff that his brakes had failed, and that this was the reason he hit the pole. The Sheriff asked to see appellant's driver's license and appellant exhibited to him a card commonly referred to as an "I.D. card" (which bears the words "U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator's Identification Card, Form SF 46") and a Motor Vehicle Operator's License, T.T. Form No. 252. It was apparent from the date on both forms that they had expired before January 4, 1963.

The appellant testified that the above forms were in his wallet, which he handed to the Sheriff, together with his Government of Guam Motor Vehicle Operator's License, #60744, which was valid at the time. This license was offered in evidence by the appellant, and it appears from its face that it is still valid, expiring March 2, 1964.

The Sheriff testified that appellant did not show him the Guam license at the time of the accident, and did not call it to his attention.

The appellant testified that his speed, at the time he hit the pole, was about four miles per hour; one of his witnesses, in the front seat with appellant at the time of the collision, testified that the truck was "moving slowly" when it hit the pole. The prosecution offered no evidence as to speed.

The prosecution offered evidence that the damage done to the pole and wires in the accident was in excess of $20.00.

OPINION