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Reports of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands |
6 TRR 27
In the Matter of the Application of
HSU DENG
SHUNG and HSU DANG BOO
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Civil Action No. 575
Trial Division of the High
Court
Palau District
June 19, 1972
Application for writ of habeas corpus. The Trial Division of the High Court, Harold W. Burnett, Chief Justice, held that the application would be refused where orderly procedures, including the right to appeal, were present.
1. Habeas Corpus - Availability of Writ
Application for writ of habeas corpus would be refused where orderly procedures, including the right to appeal, were present. (9 T.T.C. § 101)
2. Habeas Corpus - Availability of Writ
A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute can best be determined by full orderly appellate consideration, not by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (9 T.T.C. § 101)
BURNETT, Chief Justice
Defendants herein were convicted in the Trial Division of the High Court, sitting in Palau, of two counts of unlawful entry and unlawful entry of a vessel, and one count of unlawful removal of marine resources. They have filed this application for writ of habeas corpus in lieu of an appeal from that judgment, based upon the contention that their conviction and current restraint of liberty result from the reception of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
The writ is before me for determination pursuant to 9 T.T.C. 101. Section 104 of that title requires issuance of an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted, "unless it appears from the application that the person detained is not entitled thereto." I have determined that the writ should not issue, and deny the application.
[1] Initially I conclude that while the writ may be available in a proper case at any subsequent time, it should not be utilized in lieu of the orderly procedures provided, which include appellate consideration.
This principle is well established with respect to the power of a federal court to grant the writ to an applicant who has been convicted in a state court.
"Although we hold that the jurisdiction of the federal courts on habeas corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the state court proceedings, we recognize a limited discretion in the federal judge to deny relief to an applicant under certain circumstances. Discretion is implicit in the statutory command that the judge, after granting the writ and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require,' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2243; and discretion was the flexible concept employed by the federal courts in developing the exhaustion rule. Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573, 73 S.Ct. 391, 397, 97 L.Ed. 549
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