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Iyar v Mariana Island District Chief of Police [1973] TTLawRp 52; 6 TTR 401 (26 November 1973)

6 TTR 401

HENRY IYAR, INNOCENCIO KUZUMA, JOHN C. SANTOS, Petitioners

v.

MARIANA ISLAND DISTRICT CHIEF OF POLICE, Respondent

Civil Action No. 82-73

Trial Division of the High Court

Mariana Islands District

November 26, 1973

Petition for habeas corpus. The Trial Division of the High Court, Burnett, Chief Justice, held that petition would be denied where there was an adequate remedy at law.

1. Habeas Corpus-Availability of Writ

Habeas corpus is not a substitute for trial, and petition for habeas corpus by person awaiting criminal trial, on ground certain statements were taken from him by police in violation of his rights and erroneously admitted at preliminary examination to determine whether he would be held for trial, would be denied where the issue could be adequately decided at trial.

2. Habeas Corpus-Availability of Writ

Habeas corpus will not ordinarily lie where there is an adequate remedy at law.

BURNETT, Chief Justice

Defendants were charged, in Marianas District High Court Criminal No. 20-73, with murder in the first degree. The District Court, on November 9, 1973, following preliminary examination, found probable cause, and held defendants for trial before this court.

On November 23, 1973, counsel for petitioners filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, set down for hearing this date. He alleges as grounds therefor, the erroneous admission of certain statements taken from the accused, urges this court to examine the record made in the District Court, to find a denial of due process resulting in a void commitment, and to discharge petitioners.

The initial question is whether habeas corpus is available to petitioners at this stage. This court has previously held that the writ could not serve as a substitute for appeal following conviction. In the Matter of the Application of Hsu Deng Shung and Hsu Dang Boo, 6 T.T.R. 27.

[1, 2] Even more compelling is the conclusion that habeas corpus is not a substitute for the trial function. "Habeas corpus is indeed the 'Great Writ' and it is because of its stature that it remains an extraordinary remedy which will not ordinarily lie where there is an adequate remedy at law," Bland v. Rogers, 332 F.Supp. 989.

Whether the statements of petitioners were taken by police in violation of their rights can be tested in the ordinary trial process, through motion to suppress. The preliminary examination serves the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause sufficient to hold an accused to answer on trial. If there is error on the part of the District Court, ample opportunity remains for the accused to so demonstrate in the trial process; this is not a proper function of habeas corpus.

The writ of habeas corpus is not intended to serve the office of a writ of error even after verdict ; and, for still stronger reasons, it is not available to a defendant before trial, except in rare and exceptional cases, as pointed out in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 29 L.Ed. 868, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734. This is an effort to nullify that rule, and to depart from the regular course of criminal proceedings by securing from this court, in advance, a decision on an issue of law which the defendant can raise in the district court, with the right, if convicted, to a writ of error on any ruling adverse to his contention. That the orderly course of a trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted, even where the petitioner attacks on habeas corpus the constitutionality of the statute under which he was indicted, was decided in Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 56 L.Ed. 1147, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 753. That and other similar decisions have so definitely established the general principle as to leave no room for further discussion. Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 50 L.Ed. 303, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147. Johnson v. Hay 33 S.Ct. 240.

Counsel cited various sections of 5 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, to show that habeas corpus is no longer restricted to purely jurisdictional considerations, and that its scope has been expanded to preserve constitutional safeguards. Nowhere, however, do I find anything in that text to support the proposition that the writ can take the place of orderly trial procedure.

See also 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus, Section 76. "Even constitutional and jurisdictional questions will not be determined on habeas corpus where the trial court has jurisdiction to determine them. . . . Habeas corpus is not intended to perform the functions of the trial court."

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the ordinary trial process affords petitioners ample remedy for the alleged errors, that habeas corpus does not lie at this stage of the proceedings, and that the petition must be, and hereby is, Denied.