National Court of Papua New Guinea

Counsel:

M. Ruarri, for the State
A. Ninkama, for the Defendant

JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE

26th November, 2012

1. Toliken AJ. On the 09th of August 2012, Mavis Uraro pleaded guilty to the murder of Anna Komane on the 29th of July 2011 at Popondetta town, Oro Province. This is an offence under Section 300 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act Ch. 262.
   

THE BRIEF FACTS

2. The brief supporting facts are these. On 29th of July 2011 at about 11.00 a.m. the accused went looking for the deceased. She found her at the Papindo Supermarket just as she was at the check-out counter trying to pay for her shopping. The prisoner approached her from the back and stabbed the deceased on her back with a kitchen knife. The deceased was rushed to the hospital but later died from heavy loss of blood.
   
3. I confirmed the plea after reading the evidence in the committal file and being satisfied that the evidence supported the plea, I convicted the accused but was unable to pass sentence due to the large number of plea matters that were before me during the circuit. I do so now.
   

SENTENCING ISSUES

4. The main issue for me to determine is; what is an appropriate sentence for the prisoner?
   
5. To arrive at an answer to this though, I must consider the following:
   
   • the relevant facts surrounding this case
   • any mitigating and/or aggravating factors, any extenuating circumstances and other considerations
   • the sentencing trend for this kind of offence; and
   • whether any part of the sentence ought to be suspended.
     

ANTECEDENTS

6. The prisoner was at the time of the offence 22 years of age. She is now 23 years old. She is of mixed Popondetta and Chimbu parentage. She is married to one Rocky Komane. They have two children who were then aged 5 and 1. Before the offence they were living at Golf Club Settlement, Popondetta Town. She is a member of the Lutheran Church. She has no prior conviction.
   

ALLOCUTUS

7. In her address to the Court, the prisoner said that she had been having problems with her husband when he started having an affair with the deceased. She said that she has two children and had great difficulty caring for them while her husband was running around with the deceased. She said that she tried settling the matter in the community and with the police but her husband and the deceased never turned up.
   
8. The prisoner said that she was worried about her children if her husband left them. She did not want to burden her aged parents with her children.
   
9. She said that she once had a fight with the deceased but they were stopped by the police who advised them to call into the Police Station the next day to sort the matter out. On the next day which was the 29th of July 2011 she went to the Police Station but her husband and the deceased did not turn up. She called her husband who told her that he was at work. This angered her.
   
10. She left the Police Station and walked across to the Papindo Supermarket where she met the deceased at the check-out counter and stabbed her. She said that she did not intend to kill her but she died.
    
11. The prisoner said that her relatives paid a total of K22000.00 compensation to the deceased's relatives on 16th August 2011 at the Police Station.
    
12. She said that she got married to Rocky Komane when she was just 19 years old. She said she was afraid of contracting AIDS, hence she committed the offence.
    
13. The prisoner told the Court that her children are now with her husband's parents. They are, however, now old and asthmatic and she does not know if they would take proper care of the children.
    
14. She finally apologized to the Court, the deceased's family and State for breaking the law and pleaded for mercy.
    

SUBMISSIONS

15. Mr. Ninkama of counsel for the prisoner submitted that this is not a worst case of murder and therefore does not deserve the maximum prescribed penalty of life imprisonment. The Court should therefore impose a sentence lesser than life imprisonment as allowed by Section 19 of the Code.
    
16. Counsel submitted that there are strong mitigating, special mitigating factors and extenuating circumstances in favour of the prisoner. These are that the offence was committed in a domestic setting as a result of the husband's unfaithfulness. There was therefore strong non-legal provocation and the prisoner was concerned about her children's welfare and feared contracting AIDS. He, however, conceded that there are strong aggravating factors in that the prisoner attacked the deceased with a knife and that the attack was premeditated.
    
17. Counsel referred the Court to the sentencing tariffs set by the Supreme Court in Manu Kovi v. The State (2005) SC 789 and to similar cases involving killings between co-wives and single stab wound deaths upon guilty pleas. He submitted therefore that in the circumstances, this case falls in Category 2 of Manu Kovi, which is a sentence of between 16 – 20 years. However, it should attract a head sentence below that category i.e. a sentence of 12 – 15 years.
    
18. Mr. Ruarri for the State on the other hand submitted that there are strong aggravating factors against the prisoner. These include the use of an offensive weapon - a kitchen knife - and that it was a surprise attack on unsuspecting, unarmed and defenceless woman. There also seemed to have been pre-planning as the prisoner followed the deceased into town with a strong desire to cause her grievous bodily harm.
    
19. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances, this case would fall under category 3 of the Manu Kovi tariffs of 20 – 30 years. He, however, referred to the matter of Thress Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC 1017 where the Supreme Court (Salika DCJ, Kandakasi and Yagi JJ) said that despite the tariffs set in Manu Kovi the sentencing discretion of the court remains very much unfettered.
    
20. Counsel further referred to the matter of Anna Max Marangi v The State (2002) SC 702 where the Supreme Court had suggested sentencing guidelines in domestic settings.
    
21. He suggested therefore that a head sentence of between 15 – 20 years would suffice.
    

THE OFFENCE

22. The offence which with you are charged with is provided by Section 300 (1)(a) in the following terms:
    

300. Murder.

(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Code, a person who kills another person under any of the following circumstances is guilty of murder:—

(a) if the offender intended to do grievous bodily harm to the person killed or to some other person; or ...

Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life.

SENTENCING TREND

23. Murder is the second most serious of homicide offences and, fittingly attracts the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, subject of course to the court's discretion to impose a lesser sentence under Section 19 of the Code. Actual sentences have been at the most appropriately high but the courts have introduced guideline sentences and tariffs in an effort to bring about consistency in sentencing.
    
24. This began with The State v Laura (No.2) [1988-89] PNGLR 98. There the late Chief Justice Sir Buri Kidu postulated that on a plea of guilty the starting point for murder should be 6 years where there are no special aggravating factors. Where there are strong mitigating factors such as the youthfulness or very advanced age of the accused then a sentence of less than 6 years may be considered. But where the charge is denied sentences should range between 8 – 12 years or more if strong aggravating factors are shown.
    
25. Since then these tariffs have been reviewed by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases. In manslaughter and murder cases in the domestic settings the following cases come to mind. These are CRA No. 64 of 1994 Antap Yala v. The State, (1996) Unreported Supreme Court-judgement dated 31 May 1996; Jack Tanga v. The State (1999) SC 602; and John Kapil Tapi v. The State [2000] SC 635. Ise cases the trialtrial courts seemed to have meted lenient sentences on unintentional killin domestic as opposed to those in non-domestic settings.
    
26. The Supreme Court in Antap Yala (supra) (and again in Jack Tanga and John Kapil Tapi) warned that unintentional killings in domestic settings were becoming prevalent and sentences must increase appropriately.
    
27. In Anna Max Marangi v. The State (supra), an appeal against a sentence of 9 years for manslaughter, the Supreme Court discussed the above cases and the existing tariffs in manslaughter cases in domestic settings. It noted that sentences had increased up to 16 years in response to an increase in this type of unlawful killing.
    
28. The Court, however, noted that murder cases were not as prevalent but since sentences for manslaughter had increased there should be a corresponding increase. It therefore recommended that the tariffs set out in The State v Laura (No.2) (supra) be reviewed by the Supreme Court with the view of increasing the tariffs to make them consistent with sentences for manslaughter. As the matter before it concerned manslaughter, the court left it to the Supreme Court on another occasion to deliberate on.
    
29. In Simon Kama v. The State (2004) SC 740 (Sevua, Kandakasi & Lenalia) that the Supreme Court finally reviewed and adjusted the sentencing tariffs for murder.
    
30. The court, however, noted, as some judges of the first instance had done, that a misconceived practice had crept in that sought to classify murder cases. It said that this misconception had been brought about, amongst other reasons, by Bredmeyer J.'s classification wilful murders in Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR105 which sought to differentiate the wilful murder of certain classes of people as constituting different categories of wilful murder.
    
31. The court said that it is erroneous to classify murder cases except as is provided for by the Criminal Code because Parliament has already classified homicide offences into wilful murder, murder or manslaughter and only Parliament can change that.
    
32. The correct approach, the court said, was that once guilt had been established, whether on plea or after trial, the court should begin with considering the maximum prescribed penalty. It must then allow the offender to make out a case for a lesser sentence by appraising the court of mitigating factors with relevant evidence. The court should then, and only then, carefully consider the factors for and against the imposition of the maximum penalty.
    
33. Once that is done then current categorization – which I understand is not a further classification of murder cases, as it were, but the classification of relevant factors and circumstances of the offence - would be become relevant and useful.
    
34. The court was of the view then that the guidelines in The State v Laura (No.2) (supra) and Simbe v The State (supra) while relevant needed to be varied. It therefore laid down the following based on the sentences imposed to date and the prevalence of the offence:
    
    • (a) where there is a guilty plea with no factors in aggravation, a sentence of twelve (12) to sixteen (16) years;
      
    • (b) where there is a guilty plea with aggravating factors other than the use of firearms and the commission of another serious offence, a sentence between the range of seventeen (17) to thirty (30) years;
      

(c) where there is a guilty plea with aggravating factors and where there is a use of firearms and such other dangerous weapons in the course of committing or attempting to committed another serious offence, a sentence of thirty one (31) years to life imprisonment;

(d) on a plea of not guilty, with no other aggravating factors a range of sentences from seventeen (17) to twenty one (21) years;

(e) on a plea of not guilty, with aggravating factors other than the use of firearms and in the course of committing or attempting to commit another offence, a range of sentences from twenty two (22) to forty (40) years;

(f) where there is a not guilty plea with aggravating factors where there is a use of firearms and or such other dangerous weapons and or in the course of committing or attempting to committed another offence, a sentence of forty one (41) years to life imprisonment;

A trial judge has the discretion to impose a sentence below these guidelines where there exist very good mitigating factors such as a very young person persuaded by others to commit the offence falling short of the defence of compulsion to commit the offence or for other very good reason.

35. These tariffs were again reviewed by the Supreme Court in Manu Kovi v. The State (supra) (Injia DCJ (as he then was), Lenalia & Lay JJ.). This is a significant decision as the court – after a comprehensive review of existing tariffs for wilful murder, murder and manslaughter - prescribed what seemed to be exhaustive guidelines which not only categorized the factors and circumstances of offending under each offence, but, went on further to suggest starting and maximum points for each category. Set out below are the relevant sentencing guidelines and tariffs for murder per Manu Kovi.
    

36. The guidelines in Manu Kovi were, however, reconsidered in the most recent Supreme Court decision of Thress Kumbamong v. The State (supra) (Salika DCJ, Kandakasi & Yagi JJ.). This was an appeal against a 9 years sentence for manslaughter in a domestic setting where the appellant killed her husband's second partner.
    
37. There the court departed from Manu Kovi and said, among other things, in the context of killings in domestic settings, that not all cases are appropriate for imprisonment because not all offences are committed consciously.
    
38. It noted that different people react differently to extra-marital affairs. Only a very few do not react to the pressure brought about by the affair and do nothing. Most, however, can become suicidal and act in such a way that they have not acted before and thus become destructive to themselves and others.
    
39. The court recommended that the defence of provocation and self defence should therefore be extended to offenders who kill or otherwise commit offences against their spouses or their spouses' extra-marital partners or co-wives. In the absence of any law, though, the court was of the view that this kind of non-legal provocation must feature prominently as a mitigating factor and where the extra-marital affair is unprovoked by the offender this should be appropriately reflected in the sentence.
    
40. The court was of the further view that in offences committed in these circumstances, focus should be on rehabilitation of offenders and where appropriate they should be spared incarceration and given alternative sentences instead.
    
41. This seems to me to be an approval of what was said in Simon Kama v. The State (supra.) of a trial judge's unfettered discretion to impose a sentence lesser than the maximum prescribed penalty where strong mitigating factors so warrant.
    
42. The bench held that the trial judge has wide discretion under Section 19 of the Code to impose appropriate sentences and that the Supreme Court has no power to curtail, restrict or interfere with the free exercise of that discretion. The court said:
    

"... we do not take issue with the Supreme Court setting guidelines as to what sort of factors a sentencing judge should take into account but it cannot set sentencing ranges or tariffs with minimums as "starting points" and maximums within the maximums Parliament has already provided for. Instead the trial judge has and should be left with his or [her] wide discretion to impose a sentence or penalty ... he or she considers the particular circumstances of the case warrants".

43. The court then said that to do so as was done in Manu Kovi and Anna Max Maringi (supra), "to the extent that they further categorized minimum and maximum sentences within the already prescribed maximum sentences ... [is] an unnecessary and illegal curtailment or fettering and or restriction of the discretion vested in the trial judge. We are thus of the view that no trial judge should feel compelled or bound to follow those prescriptions."
    
44. Whilst the above apply generally across the board, this is a type of murder which has increased dramatically over the years - unlawful killings in domestic settings.
    
45. The courts have tried to discourage the commission of these offences (wilful murder, murder and manslaughter) by imposing stiff custodial sentences but these seem to have had no effect at all.
    
46. Back in 2000 when passing down a 12- year sentence in The State v. Drikore Yuana Peter (2000) N1973, on a woman who had killed her co-wife, Kirriwom J. considered previous sentences by the court in The State v. Maria Er [1998] PNGLR 26 (8 years, Injia J. (as he then was)); The State v. Margaret John (No.2) [1996] PNGLR 298 (6 years) and The State v. Maria Pelta Pung (Yamai) [1995] PNGLR 173 (8 years, Akuram AJ.) and said:
    

" ... both their honours took a very stern view of the upsurge of this crime and said that strong deterrent sentences were necessary to deter wives or co-wives involved in domestic disputes with their husbands, or with the husbands' girlfriends or as between co-wives themselves."

47. The problem has not been arrested nor have we reduced the number of killings in the domestic settings despite the fact that sentences have increased proportionately.
    
48. By 2008 Makail J. expressed quite resignedly in The State v Lossy Karapus (2009) N3640 that:
    

"... I have dealt with a number of this kind of cases and I am beginning to wonder whether or not the National Court has done enough to curb killings in a domestic setting like in your case. This is because it appears that no matter how many cases of this nature are brought before the Court and a strong deterrent sentence is imposed on offenders, there are still a large number of such cases coming before the Court."

49. And the courts can probably never eradicate these types of killings because as Kirriwom J. rightly put it in Drekore Yuana Peter (supra) the problem "is more deeply rooted than simply penalising and incarcerating the already overly abused and battered wives who have the misfortune to go overboard in their emotional reactions by causing the death of another."
    
50. And no doubt similar statements have been made by my senior brother judges in other cases and occasions. I, however, unfortunately do not have time quote them here.
    
51. But perhaps the only thing that I can add here is that we will never succeed eradicating killings of this nature as long as we have unfaithful and philandering spouses (mostly husbands) who do not feel the slightest compunction for their infidelity or are made to take responsibility for their actions and as long as we have battered, abused, violated and deserted wives.
    
52. It cannot be overstated that the deep emotional and psychological damage brought upon such women affect their very soul. Insecurity sets in which unfortunately brings up the primal instinct to protect oneself and one's own against what is seen as invasion of their marriage. Unfortunately they end up hurting or even killing those they see as invaders.
    
53. The Supreme Court in Thress Kambamong (supra) discussed this more eloquently and at great length. And it restated what Kirriwom J. and others have been saying all along that the cure lies not in continuing to punish and incarcerate broken and battered women by imposing increasingly stiff sentences. The cure lies, rather, in legislative action to have unfaithful men take responsibility for their infidelity and for the courts to take a more rehabilitative approach when sentencing victim offenders, if I could be permitted to label as such.
    
54. Let me consider just a few of these sentences in the recent past.
    
55. In The State v Maria Tuu (2008) N3706, the prisoner, the second of two wives of a man, killed the first wife during an argument by stabbing her with a kitchen knife which penetrated the right kidney and the liver. The prisoner intended to do grievous bodily harm to deceased. She pleaded guilty to murder. David J. took into account the prisoner's plea, that she was a first time offender, she co-operated with police, there was de facto provocation and that the prisoner was remorseful and had shown that by paying "belkol" compensation. His Honour held that the circumstances of the case fell under category 2 of the Manu Kovi tariffs and imposed sentence of 16 years.
    
56. In The State v Alis Nema Mara (2010) N4133 the prisoner had pleaded guilty to manslaughter. She had found the deceased and her husband together and fought with the deceased who was armed with a kitchen knife. The prisoner wrestled the knife from the deceased and stabbed her on the back. The knife penetrated the deceased back puncturing the right lung. The deceased died from massive blood loss.
    
57. Makail J. considered the prisoner's plea, that she was a first time offender, the assault consisted of single knife blow inflicting a single wound, strong de facto provocation, constant abuse and eventual desertion by the husband as mitigating the offence. Her line had also paid K12000 and 20 pigs as compensation.
    
58. But against these were the following aggravating factors; Prevalence of the offence; use of kitchen knife; some element of pre-planning and some element of deliberate intention to harm.
    
59. His considered that the case fell somewhere between Categories 1 & 2 of the Manu Kovi tariffs and sentenced the prisoner to 12 years.
    
60. In The State v Anita Kelly (2009) N3624 the prisoner pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her co-wife. She stabbed her once on the neck resulting in her death. This was a surprise attack with some element of viciousness and pre-planning. There was very strong de-facto provocation. The prisoner had been subjected to domestic violence and abuse, by her husband who had also deserted her and the children leaving her to fend for herself and the children. A sentence of 12 years was imposed.
    
61. In the State v Lossy Karapus (supra), the prisoner killed her husband's girl friend by stabbing her multiple times with a kitchen knife because of the husband's unfaithfulness. The prisoner pleaded guilty and the court found that there was strong de-facto provocation. However, it found that there was some element of pre-planning and level of viciousness in the attack as evidence by the multiple wounds inflicted on the deceased. The prisoner was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
    
62. By way of comparison, in The State v Kevin Wakore (2007) N3222 the prisoner pleaded guilty to murder. He was in company of his relatives. They were armed with a home-made guns and knives. They attacked the deceased killing him by shooting him once in the chest and cutting him twice with a bush knife. The court held this to be a vicious killing but there was no pre-planning. He was sentenced to 12 years but had 4 years of this sentence suspended on condition.
    

AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE

63. To arrive at an appropriate sentence of the prisoner, I need to first consider those factors that are in her favour and those against her. These are the mitigating and aggravating factors.
    
64. In her favour I find the following factors.
    
    • she pleaded guilty to the charge at the earliest opportunity
    • she is a first time offender
    • There was strong non-legal provocation offered to her by her husband's unfaithfulness coupled with his and the deceased's failure to avail themselves for settlement of the prisoner's grievances both at community level and at the police station.
    • she was youthfully offender who got married pretty young at the age of 19.
    • her relatives have paid K22000 compensation to the deceased's relatives two weeks after the offence.
    • she acted alone
    • she inflicted a single though fatal stab wound on the deceased
      
65. But against her I find the following aggravating factors:
    
    • she used a dangerous weapon, i.e. a kitchen knife to stab the deceased
    • this offence is becoming, in fact, has become prevalent
    • there appears to have been a degree of pre-planning on her part
    • The wound though single seemed to have been inflicted with some force as the Post Mortem report revealed:
      
      • (i) a 10 cm wound at the posterior aspect of the deceased's upper chest near the spine. A through and through wound entering the chest.
      • (ii) punctured apex of the right lung
      • (iii) severed intercostals artery near the spine which was the major cause of bleeding
        
66. I must now proceed to determine a sentence that is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. But before I come to that can it be viewed objectively that this is a case that falls in the worst category so as to attract the maximum penalty of life imprisonment? I think not. If anything it falls in lower to mid-range of this kind of offence.
    
67. Now the next question that I am confronted with now is; should I feel bound by the sentencing tariffs set in Manu Kovi and fix a starting point within the categories and sentencing ranges proposed there or should I take the approach advocated in Thress Kumbamong?
    
68. If I were to apply the Manu Kovi tariffs, this case would fall under Category 2 attracting a sentence of between 16 – 20 years. This is because even though the prisoner had, among other things, pleaded guilty, is a first time offender and was provoked in the non-legal sense, her offence nonetheless involved the use of a weapon, there was a slight degree of pre-planning and a degree of viciousness despite no strong intention to cause grievous bodilyharm on the deceased.
    
69. Now there must not be any delusion on the prisoner's part that she will be incarcerated. The maximum for this offence is life imprisonment which, fortunately for her, is not appropriate because yours is not a worst case.
    
70. Life is sacred. And anybody who takes someone else's life without lawful justification must pay heavily. Taking someone's life is depriving him or her of the right to life which on the lower end of the scale is a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens and persons living in this country by the Constitution (s. 35) and, on the higher end, given by the author of life himself, the Creator Jehovah God.
    
71. I take full cognizance of the mitigating factors operating in the prisoner's favour – her early guilty plea, her youthfulness when she committed the offence, her remorse, evidenced by the very substantial compensation payment of K22000 by her relatives, the non-legal provocation offered to her under which she snapped and committed the offence and the emotional and psychological effects of her husband's infidelity and/or polygynous inclinations, (the latter two being very strong mitigating factors) and the effect a lengthy imprisonment term will have on her children.
    
72. These factors are, however, weighed against the aggravating factors, principle among which being that the prisoner unlawfully and prematurely ended the deceased's life, who despite her fault in going around with the prisoner's husband, deserved to live as much as the prisoner does.
    
73. Someone out there has lost a daughter, a sister, granddaughter, a niece or a relative in the deceased. The prisoner attacked the deceased with a kitchen knife from the back. She was not aware of the impending fatal assault on her in a very public place and hence was not in a position to defend herself. She did not attack the prisoner first nor did she offer any verbal insults to her as some had done in the cases surveyed above. Yes I do accept that the prisoner was frustrated that the deceased and your husband did not turn up at the police station but this did not give her the right to do what she did even though her judgment may have been somewhat clouded.
    
74. So going back to whether I should impose a sentence within Category 2 of the Manu Kovi tariffs or take the Thress Kumbamong approach, I feel that I must take the middle ground. These decisions are obviously at loggerheads and must be reconciled by the Supreme Court itself.
    
75. I agree that as a sentencing judge my discretion under Section 19 of the Code cannot be eroded, restricted or curtailed by any authority other than Parliament through legislation. I, however, also take full cognizance of the various factors and circumstances that the Supreme Court said in Manu Kovi are to be taken into account when sentencing offenders in those categories that it proposed.
    
76. However, given the differing views of the Supreme Court on the minimums and maximums laid down in Manu Kovi, I feel inclined to harken to the call by the bench in Thress Kumbamong to not be compelled to follow Manu Kovi. This is simply because as the court said in Kumbamong the fixing of minimum starting points and maximums within the maximum prescribed penalty is an unnecessary fettering of the sentencing judge's discretion.
    
77. This is, however, not to say that the courts will not treat killings of this nature with the seriousness they deserve. All it means is that the court should address itself meaningfully to all the circumstances under which the offence was committed to arrive at a sentence that befits a particular case. In other words the punishment must fit the crime – the principle of equivalence.
    
78. So having regard to the circumstances of this offence, which show that the aggravating factors are outweighed by factors in mitigation (which have prominent mitigating factors like non-legal provocation and payment of substantial compensation) I feel that I should determine a starting point below the starting point in Category 2 of Manu Kovi, in the free and unfettered exercise of my discretion under Section 19 of the Code, as suggested by Thress Kumbamong.
    
79. Hence I fix a starting point at 14 years. I am fully aware that this would place it just above Category 1 for manslaughter in the Manu Kovi tariffs but this is what I feel strongly the justice of this case requires.
    
80. All things considered, an appropriate sentence should be 12 years imprisonment – a sentence that is well above the one imposed on Thress Kumbamong for manslaughter which the Supreme Court confirmed on appeal.
    
81. From this I deduct 1 year 3 months and 28 days for pre-sentence custody period. The balance which you are to serve will be 10 years, 8 months and 2 days (Criminal Justice (Sentences) Act 1986, s 3).
    

SUSPENSION

82. The next question is; should the sentence be wholly or partially suspended?
    
83. This question arises because as the Supreme Court said in Thress Kumbamong at para.64:
    

"The courts need to re-examine and identify cases that require imprisonment for the protection of the society and the cases that do not warrant imprisonment but correction outside the prison system. This is not a new thing. The courts have been doing that for centuries but have failed to guarantee safer societies. What is new, however, is the question of what should be the primary focus of criminal sentencing and the suggested answer of correction and rehabilitation and not necessarily imprisonment in prisons. Adopting such an approach would enable the courts to address that which matters most, which is the emotional needs of an offender and the society as a whole for a safer society."

84. So would the society be any safer if a cheated, abused and manipulated youthful woman like the prisoner were to be kept away from society in our prisons? I think not. The prisoner is someone who needs correction, rehabilitation and counselling so that the trauma that she had gone through can be addressed for her to assimilate back into society.
    
85. I therefore consider suspending at least part of the sentence to be appropriate. There is no question that the court has the general power to suspend sentence under Section 19 (6) of the Code. A sentence may be suspended if it will promote the personal deterrence, reformation or rehabilitation of the offender (The Public Prosecutor –v– Bruce William Tardew (1986) PNGLR 91).
    
86. I find further authority in none other than the case of Thress Kumbamong itself where the Supreme Court suspended 6 years and 11 months of the 9 year sentence and bound the offender over to be of good behaviour.
    
87. Then there is the case of The State v Lawrence Mattau (2008) N3865 where Kandakai J fully suspended the prisoner's 10 years sentence for manslaughter on conditions. Finally in The State v Kevin Wakore (2007) N3222 where Cannings J. suspended 4 years from the prisoner's 12 years sentence for murder. It is worth mentioning that the latter cases involved the use of firearms.
    
88. I propose therefore to suspend 5 years and 2 days from the sentence on condition that the prisoner will enter into her own recognizance to be of good behaviour for the whole period of her suspended sentence.
    
89. The prisoner's sentence therefore is as follows:
    

90. I therefore order as follows:
    
    1. The prisoner is sentenced to 12 years imprisonment
       
    2. One (1) year, three (3) months and 28 days shall be deducted for pre-sentence custody period
       
    3. The resultant sentence therefore is 10 years, 8 months and 2 days.
       
    4. The prisoner shall serve 5 years of her sentence at the Biru Corrective Institution
       
    5. The balance of 5 years, 8 months and 2 days is suspended on the condition that the prisoner shall enter into her own recognizance to be of good behaviour for the whole period of her suspended sentence.
       
    6. In the event that the Prisoner breaches her recognizance, the said recognizance shall be forfeited and she shall be committed to prison at Biru to serve the balance of her suspended sentence.
       

_____________________________________________
Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
Paraka Lawyers: Lawyer for the Prisoner