Supreme Court of Palau

Tr. 80:17–81:21.

[ 7] Ngirkelau suggesat, base based on this testimony, Baiei did not know that the land was going to be sold before it was sold. See Ngirkelau’s Opening Br. 9 (“Be the property was taken before the owner became aware of i of it being taken or sold and without the consent or knowledge of that owner, this constituted a force taking.”). The testimony, however, indicates that Baiei discussed the sale with those who negotiated the sale. It appears that he explained to them that he did not want to sell, but wanted to rent the land instead, which indicates that he knew that the Japanese Government was interested in using the land. It is not entirely clear whether the sale took place before or after those discussions. The Trust Territory District Land Title Officer hearing claim 183 determined that the Chief of Koror, Kloulubak Fritz, sold the land to the Japanese Government for a school site. For the sale, Baiei received 600 yen. As a result, the government prevailed in that claim.
[ 8] At the hearing e Land Cond Court case at issue here, Ngirkelau’s representative testified that, at the time of Baiei’s testimony in the Trust Territory case claim Baiei had not filed a claim for the land. Tr. 23:23–2211;24:1. Instead, his testimony was as a witness for the government, id., against claimant “Ngirchomlei who was apparently claiming for Tpang Clan.” Decision 8. Based on that testimony and the fact that Baiei did not file a claim in the Trust Territory case or attempt to prove that the compensation was unjust, the Land Court determined that Baiei was compensated for the sale of the land and “understood that it was a full and final purchase.” Id.
[ 9] Ngirkelau&#82claim is onis one for wrongful taking under 35 PNC § 1304(b). “In a return of public lands case, the claimant must show that a piece of property became public land ‘through focoercion, fraud, or withoutthout just compensation or adequate consideration’ in addition to showing a proper connection to the land.” Idid Clan II, 20 ROP at 273 (quoting 35 PNC § 1304(b)(1)–(2)). “‘At all times, the burden of proof remains on the claimants, not the governmental land authority, to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that they satisfy all requirements of the [Land Registration Act].’” Id. (quoting Palau Pub. Lands Auth. v. Ngiratrang, 13 ROP 90, 93 (2006)). Whether land became public land through a wrongful taking is a factual determination. Id. at 274; see also Airai State Pub. Lands Auth. v. Esuroi Clan, 22 ROP 4, 7 (2014) (“Any allegation that the land in question was not conveyed, but was taken by force, is a challenge to the Land Court’s factual findings.”). As such, the Appellate Division reviews for clear error the Land Court’s determination that the land was not wrongfully taken. Clear error requires reversal only if the finding “so lack[s] evidentiary support in the record that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion.” Midar v. Narchelong State Pub. Lands Auth., 22 ROP 151, 152 (2015) (citation omitted).
[ 10] Here, the evidentiupporupport for the Land Court’s determination was not so lacking that “no reasonable finder of fact could have reached the same conclusion.” See id. The Land Court re in part, on testimony from from Baiei at the Trust Territory hearing and on the judgment in that matter, but also on testimony of Ngirkelau’s representative before the Land Court. The Land Court’s ruling is supported by evidence that Baiei received compensation for the land and later did not contest the government’s ownership, but in fact, testified on its behalf in an ownership determination hearing. The Land Court did not clearly err in its determination that the property was not wrongfully taken. As a result, the Land Court’s determination with respect to Tochi Daicho lot 859 and Ngirkelau’s claim is AFFIRMED.

II. Idid Clan’s Claim

[ 11] Idid Clan filedturn of n of public lands claim on December 30, 1988. It did not file a claim for superior title. Idid Clan originally claimed KSPLA lease lots 40554 – 40nd 40592, but abandoned its claim to lots 40554 and 40555 w555 when it understood those two lots to be part of the lands listed as held by the Palau Administration in the Tochi Daicho. The remaining lots claimed by Idid Clan fall within Tochi Daicho lots 854 through 857, which were registered to Ngermesungil Lineage with Ngiraked as its trustee.
[ 12] The Land Court surmihat that Idid Clan and other claimants presented evidence that supported Idid Clan’s ownership of Tochi Daicho lots 854 th 857. For example, a claimant adverse to Idid Clan provided testimony that the Land Court curt categorized as “detailed and very credible in terms of proving that the lands claimed . . . were private lands in the Tochi Daicho.” Decision 12. The adverse claimant also provided what the Land Court called “extensive factual information” about the area and the people involved. Id. In addition, Idid Clan presented further evidence that the land was privately owned, including that there is an odesongel for Ngermesungil Lineage there. Idid Clan also requested that the Land Court compare the Tochi Daicho lot sizes with the actual sizes of the leased lots to determine whether overlap existed between the land registered to the government and that registered in the Tochi Daicho to Ngermesungil Lineage. The comparison showed that the sizes were similar, and the Land Court stated that, if Idid Clan moved the western boundary of its claim slightly to the east, “[the] claimed lots would soon match the sizes of the Tochi Daicho lots.” Decision 11.
[ 13] The Lanrt determined thed that Idid Clan did not provide evidence of a wrongful taking, so it could not prevail on that theory. It further acknowledged that Idid Clan ot pursue that theory, instead focusing its case on evidencidence supporting a superior title claim. The Land Court stated that “there is enough evidence in this case to find that most of the lots claimed by [Idid Clan] correspond to the private Tochi Daicho lots claimed and should be awarded as claimed for Ngermesungil Lineage,” but it did not award Idid Clan those lands.^[6] Decision 12. Instead, the Land Court determined that, because Idid Clan did not file a separate claim to preserve a superior title cause of action, given recent case law developments, Idid Clan could not prevail on a superior title theory. Id. at 13.
[ 1 appeal, Idid Clan seeks teks to have its claim treated as a superior title claim.^[7] It further contends that if it had “filed [its] claim[] asperior title claim, then [ien [it] may have forfeited [its] right to claim the same land against KSPLA’s claim that it is public land.” Idid Clan’s Reply Br. 2. In addition, it argues that the Land Court misapplied case law to the facts in this case. These arguments fail. Moreover, Idid Clan should have known that its arguments would fail, as it has been before this Court repeatedly on the same issues.
[ 15] A Land Cclaimant may asay assert two types of claims:

(1) a superior title claim, in which the claimant asserts he holds the strongest title to the land claimed; and (2) a return of pulands claim, in which the cthe claimant concedes that a public entity holds superior title to the land, but argues that the title was acquired wrongly from the claimant or his predecessors.

Idid Clan II, 20 ROP at 273. Return of public lands claims needed to have been filed by January 1, 1989, and any superior title claim must be filed “no later than thirty (30) days after the mailing of the notice” of monumentation. 35 PNC § 1309; see also Idid Clan III, 22 ROP at 69 n.2 (explaining the deadline for filing various types of claims). “[A] claimant desiring to pursue both types of claims [return of public lands and superior title] must present and preserve the claims individually.” Idid Clan II, 20 ROP at 273 (citing Idid Clan v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 9 ROP 12, 14 n. 3 (2001) (holding that alternative claims must be “presented and preserved as if they were presented by different persons”)). “[I]f a claim has not been preserved properly, it may not be considered.” Idid Clan II, 20 ROP at 273 (citing L.C. Reg. 12 (“Any claim which is not timely filed shall be forfeited.”) and Ngarameketii v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 16 ROP 229, 231 (2009) (return of public lands claim may not be considered as superior title claim in order to avoid statutory deadline)).

[ 16]his case, Idid Clan did did not file a superior title claim at all. Given that Idid Clan has been in this situation before, see Idid Clan II, 20 ROP at 273 and Idid Clan III<22 ROP at 70, it had more rore reason than other litigants to have understood that it needed to have filed a superior title claim to preserve that cause of action. Based on this prior experience, it should have also known to focus its case on presenting sufficient evidence to support a claim for wrongful taking.
[ 17] As we have previously Iold Idid Clan:

We recognize, and sympathize with, the Land Court’s vexing predicament. Below, the only claim before the court was a returnublic lands claim for land, which the court determined as a as a factual matter at the very outset, was not public. Thus, absent a claim for superior title, the Land Court would be required to issue a determination of ownership in favor of the public lands authority if all claimants’ return of public lands claims fail. See 35 PNC § 1312. Here, doing so might actually effect, in the view of the Land Court, a wrongful taking of the land from the rightful owners it found—Idid Clan. But the legislature could not have been clearer on this point; the Land Claims Reorganization Act has been amended a number of times, and each time the legislature has maintained and/or expressly included this limiting language: “Any claim which is not timely filed shall be forfeited.” See, e.g., Land Claims Reorganization Act, RPPL 4-43 § 8(a); 2003 Amendments, RPPL 6-31 § 2; 2008 Amendments, RPPL 7-54 § 2.