Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback High Court of Solomon Islands

Dalo v Reginam [1987] SBHC 15; [1987] SILR 43 (23 June 1987)

[1987] SILR 43

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Criminal Case No. 20 of 1987

DALO

-v-

REGINAM

High Court of Solomon Islands
(Ward C.J.)
Criminal Case No.20 of 1987

Hearing: 23 June 1987
Judgment: 23 June 1987

Sentence - effect of delay in bringing prosecution.

Facts:

The accused appealed against a sentence of eighteen months imprisonment for unlawful wounding.

The offence first came before the court three years after it was committed.

Held:

The sentence was correct in law but due allowance might not have been made for the hardship caused by the delay, and sentence reduced to twelve months.

Observed:

Where there has been serious delay without reasonable explanation, a very substantial reduction of sentence should be considered.

C. Hays for the Appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent

WARD CJ: This is an appeal against a sentence of 18 months imprisonment imposed for an offence of unlawful wounding.

The incident arose out of a dispute over fishing rights. During the argument, the appellant used a sharpened stick that was kept in his boat for fishing to spear the victim’s leg causing a wound 3 inches deep.
The appellant suggest that the learned Principal Magistrate failed to take into account the circumstances of the case and the sentence was therefore manifestly excessive.

There is no reason to suggest that the learned Magistrate did not take all relevant matters into account in considering the offence. In fact the record shows he did consider them and made allowance for them.

It is perfectly clear that the sentence is correct in law and he was right to consider including a deterrent element in cases where violence has erupted from a land dispute. On that basis I would have dismissed the appeal.

However, the offence occurred on 2nd February 1984 and was first before the court on 3rd February 1987 – three years later. Counsel for the respondent could give no reason for this delay.

Such extreme delay is totally unreasonable and unjust. Quite apart from the sense of uncertainty it causes, the penalty imposed so much later is often made all the harsher by the delay.

In this case, the appellant has, since the offence, committed no other offence and has obtained a good job. The sentence of imprisonment will lose him that job.

Although the learned magistrate refers to the fact that the appellant has been out of trouble since February 1984 and was clearly aware of delay, I feel he may not have made due allowance for the hardship caused by the delay.

I may well be failing to give credit to the magistrate, for his sentencing judgement was well written and showed a sensible and careful approach to the case.

However, in perhaps an over-abundance of caution, I shall allow the appeal and reduce the sentence to one of twelve months imprisonment.

I add the comment that far too many cases are still coming to the courts after a very considerable delay by the police. The prosecution in such cases should expect the court to ask the reason for the delay and ensure any necessary enquiries are made before the case comes to court.

Where magistrates find that there has been serious delay and no reasonable explanation is given, they should consider reducing the sentence very substantially because of the aggravating effect of a sentence imposed long after the offence.