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High Court of Solomon Islands |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(Chetwynd J)
Civil Claim No. 114 of 2009
BETWEEN:
RUSSELL ISLANDS PLANTATION ESTATES LIMITED
First Claimant
AND
LEVER SOLOMONS LIMITED
Second Claimant
AND
SOLOMON ISLANDS NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS
First Defendant
AND
NATIONWIDE LIMITED
Second Defendant
AND
DAVID TUHANUKU
Third Defendant
AND
TONY KAGOVAI
Fourth Defendant
AND
BARRY SAMSOM
Fifth Defendant
AND
REGINALD KOKILI
Sixth Defendant
AND
FISHER YOUNG LULU AND OTHERS
Seventh Defendants (Jointly)
AND
JOSEPH LEO
Eighth Defendant
AND
OGE LAKENO
Ninth Defendant
AND
WILLIE AFURAI
Tenth Defendant
AND
ANDREW KUVU
Eleventh Defendant
Mr Nori for the Claimants
Ms Bird for First to Seventh Defendants
Eighth to Eleventh Defendants not present and not represented
Date of Hearing: 14th April 2010
Date of Judgment: 27th April 2010
Ruling
I must apologise to Counsel and their clients in this case. When I heard this application on 14th April I advised Counsel that I would be away attending a conference and workshop from 16th April. I did say I would do my best to provide a ruling before I left. Unfortunately there were administrative problems associated with the overseas trip which needed my personal attention and I was not able to do as I had promised. Having taken the papers away with me and whilst considering my ruling I came to the conclusion that the matter was relatively simple and had I been able to concentrate on preparing the ruling I would have been able to hand it down before I left. I have prepared this written ruling for distribution to the parties and I apologise for the delay.
The application made by the Claimants and it was for summary judgment. A defence to the claim has been filed, albeit somewhat late in the day.
I accept that the application was filed before any defence was lodged. Some of the potency of the application has been lost because of the defence now before the court.
Summary Judgment is appropriate when either no defence has been filed, or where the defence that has been filed is devoid of any merit, or where there has been some substantial breach of orders of the court. Quite often, the latter gives rise to an application for striking out rather than an application for summary judgment on the claim or counterclaim.
In this case, the details of which I need not go into, a defence has been filed. It was filed on the afternoon of 12th April, just about 2 days before the hearing. Whilst it does contain admissions, the defence does raise issues which are suitable to be determined by the court. Those issues cannot, in my view, be said to be devoid of any merit. The claim seeks permanent injunctions against the Defendants in one guise or another, in order to protect what is said to be the property of the Claimants on the Russell Islands and on Guadalcanal. The Defendants are, again in one guise or another, employees or former employees of the Claimants, particularly the First Claimants. There is considerable evidence about the actions of the Defendants, damage they have said to have caused, and the consequences for the Claimants. The only claim is for a permanent injunction.
The defence raises issues about the actions and behaviour of executives working for the Claimants, about decisions made by the Trade Disputes Panel (and confirmed by the High Court) and about the status of some of the Defendants viz the Claimants. Whilst it might be said that some of the issues raised by the Defendants, or some of them, may not be of great merit they cannot, as I have already said, be described as being totally without merit or alternatively to be of so little merit they ought not to be considered. In all the circumstances I do not believe this to be an instance where summary judgment is appropriate.
I am also of the view that the temporary injunctions ordered by the court are sufficient in themselves to protect any property, particularly on the Russell Islands, belonging to the Claimants. There have been amendments to the original order which were more or less made by consent. I also bear in mind the Claimants have said in submissions that despite the temporary injunction and subsequent orders amending it, the situation in the Russell Islands remains very much as it was when the action was commenced. In other words the Claimants have been unable, or unwilling, to fully enforce the orders of the court. I am not sure how entering judgment, making the injunction permanent rather than temporary, will change all that. I am also concerned that decisions and results in other cases before the court may have a bearing on the remedy sought by the Claimants in this case. Given the protection inherent in the orders already made and given the issues raised by the defence, I am doubly sure summary judgment is not appropriate at this stage. I refuse the application.
Normally costs would follow the event but in this application, and given the recent filing of the defence, the appropriate order, so far as costs are concerned, is that each party should bear their own costs.
Chetwynd J
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/sb/cases/SBHC/2010/15.html