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Regina v Chite [2017] SBHC 110; HCSI-CRC 309 of 2017 (24 October 2017)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Criminal Case Number 309 of 2017

REGINA

V

CHITE

High court of Solomon Islands

Criminal Jurisdiction

Criminal Case Number 309 of 2017

Date of Hearing: 20^th October 2017

Date of Judgment: 24^th October 2017

Counsels for the Crown: Mr. John Wesley Zoze

Counsel for the Accused: Mr. George Gray

JUDGMENT

Kouhota PJ:

The respondent Lyndon Philimy Chite pleaded guilty to a charge of careless driving contrary to section 40(1) of the road Traffic Act Cap 131, in the Central Magistrate’s Court on 20^th June 2017. The particulars of the charge before the magistrate was that the respondent, on the 25^th September 2016, was driving a motor vehicle, black caldina, car registration number MB 4302, along the Kukum Highway when it hit the Guadalcanal Province (G.Province) Office security fence causing damage to the fence.

After hearing the facts and mitigation, the magistrate went on to ask the prosecutor for a quotation of the damage. The prosecution stated that there was no quotation. The magistrate then ordered the matter to be struck out for no proper investigation.

It was against that decision that the Director of Public Prosecution brought this appeal. The appellant submits that the learned magistrate erred in fact and in law when she struck out the matter for lack of proper investigation and sought orders that this court remit the matter to a different constituted magistrate’s court and make any such orders as the court sees fit.

The respondent conceded the appeal but submitted that, rather than remitting the matter to the magistrates court, the court should imposed an appropriate sentence by virtue of section 293 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (CPC)

Section 293(2) of the CPC states “At the hearing of an appeal the High Court may-

(a) If it thinks that a different sentence should have been passed, quashed the sentence passed by the magistrate’s court and pass such other sentence warranted in law, (whether more or less severe) in substitution therefor as it thinks ought to have been passed”

The appellant on the hand submits that the matter should be remitted back to the magistrate’s court to go before another magistrate. There appellant made three pertinent submissions;

1. 1. That the learned magistrate erred in law by wrongly exercising her discretion to strike out the case when the respondent had entered a guilty plea. That section 257 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that if the accused pleads guilty then the plea should be on recorded and he should be convicted thereon.
2. 2. The Court (magistrate) did not make proper record of the conviction on the bench note but proceeded to hear from police Prosecution on facts of the case. That the magistrate should consider this is a matter for disposal at the respondent’s guilty plea, should have not have struck out the matter but complete its disposal.
3. The learned magistrate erred in fact when she struck out the case solely for reasons that the prosecution could not produce a quotation for damages caused by the respondent as a result of careless driving.

I accept first part of appellant’s first submission as the correct, the magistrate clearly erred in striking out the case. The appellant reference to section 257 of CPC however, is irrelevant to this matter, as section 257 of CPC is concern with pleas taken to information before the High Court. The correct section dealing with pleas before the magistrate’s court is section 195 of the CPC. The procedure of what should happen after a guilty plea before the magistrate’s court however, is similar as in the High Court.

With regard to the second submission, I must agree with the appellant, it is clear from the bench notes that no conviction was entered. It is however, a usual practice for the magistrate after the plea is taken to procced to hear the facts of the case before entering a conviction. In my view, this is a desirable practice because sometimes a guilty plea may be equivocal and the accused may later disagree with the facts after they had been read. When that happens, the court must enter a plea of not guilty for the accused. If a conviction is entered before the facts are heard, and the accused then disagrees with facts, it means that the magistrate will have to remove the conviction entered immediately after the plea and then enter a not guilty plea instead. This may raise questions as to whether the magistrate could remove or quash its own conviction once a conviction is entered.

With regard to the appellant third submission, I agree that the magistrate erred when she struck out the case for reasons that the prosecution fail to produce a quotation of the damage caused to the fence. Damaged caused to any property by careless driving is not an element of the offence of careless driving although it may be res ipsa loquitur, but whether or not the value of the damage was produced to the court, this should not affect the conviction or compel the court to struck out the case against the accused. The procedure of dealing with pleas before the magistrates court are set out in section 195 of the CPC and the magistrate is obliged to follow the procedures. The magistrate’s court is a creature of statue, hence, it cannot act outside or beyond the procedures, practices and processes stipulated by the statutes.

I had also considered the respondent submission that the court should not remit the matter back to the magistrate’s court but passed sentence on the respondent. However, my view is that section 293(2) referred to by counsel for the respondent deals specifically with appeals against sentence, whereas in the present case this is an appeal by the DPP against the striking out of the case against the respondent rather than an appeal against sentence hence it would be inappropriate for the court to pass sentence on the respondent.

Having considered the grounds of appeal, the submissions and the fact that respondent conceded the appeal, I allow the appeal. The magistrate’s order to strike out the case against the respondent is quashed. I order that the matter be remitted to a different constituted magistrate’s court to deal with the case de novo.

Right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court

Emmanuel Kouhota

Puisne Judge