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Public Prosecutor v Kalmet [1984] VULawRp 15; [1980-1994] Van LR 122 (9 November 1984)

[1980-1994] Van LR 122

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal (Appeal) Case No. 12 of 1984

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

-v-

JAMES SKATUR KALMET

Coram: Chief Justice Cooke

Counsel: Mr Rissen for appellant
Mr Kattan, Public Prosecutor

JUDGMENT

[CRIMINAL LAW - motor vehicle offences - STATUTES - interpretation of driving in a manner dangerous]

This is an appeal by the Public Solicitor against the findings of the learned Senior Magistrate. The grounds of the appeal are:-

(a) That the Court erred in Law in its findings that the driving of the accused was dangerous to the public.
(b) The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive for the offence committed.

The facts in this case were:-

On the 20th March 1984 a French teacher, the Respondent, was driving his car No. 5796 along Elluk Road at about 1.15 pm on his way to the French Embassy School in the Colardeau Avenue when at the Houstalet Restaurant, on the same road, the Appellant who had come in his car No. 6237 from Dauphine Street, a side road to the left of the Respondent and was proceeding across Elluk Road going toward the continuation of Dauphine Street on the opposite side, ran into the car of the Respondent causing certain damage to the Respondent's car and some physical injuries to the Respondent and his wife who was travelling with him in his car.

The Appellant was charged under Section 13 of Joint Regulation No. 4 of 1962 with driving his car No. 6237 in a manner dangerous to the public, an offence punishable under Section 47 of the said Joint Regulation. The Appellant was found guilty by the learned Senior Magistrate and fined 8000VT or 1 month's imprisonment.

Mr Rissen, the Public Solicitor, who argued the appeal for the Appellant stated that he was seeking an interpretation of Section 13 of the Joint Regulation. He read section 13 and submitted that the last sentence of the section had little value in the interpretation of the section. He submitted that the word "dangerous" had a narrow meaning and that it was the bounden duty of every driver of a vehicle to pay attention to all users of the road. He finally submitted that the Court must satisfy itself there was a high degree of negligence before it can convict.

Mr Kattan, the Public Prosecutor, in reply submitted that in this country there was only one offence and that was dangerous driving. That the section included driving without due care and attention and negligent driving and that Section 13 must be interpreted in toto and that the final sentence of the section cannot be forgotten as Mr Rissen submitted.

To seek some guidance on interpretation of statutes one should in my opinion resort to that useful book of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition. There it is stated that the rule of construction is:-

(1) "to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed",
(2) "the intention of Parliament must of course be deduced from the language used for it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make law", and
(3) "where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise".

I do not agree with Mr Rissen's submission that the final sentence of Section 13 has little value in interpreting the section. In my opinion it has the value of indicating how a driver must control his car, i.e. must pay attention to his speed and drive his vehicle with care. This of course means all drivers.

In the case before me the Appellant entered the main road from a side road and was attempting to cross to a road directly opposite him but to do so had to cross the major road. Can it be said that he paid attention to his speed or drove his vehicle with care? If he did such in this case, no accident would have happened. The Appellant could not see the approach of traffic from his right until he actually entered the major road and Dauphine road which would have prevented by the same bamboo hedge until the Appellant's car entered the main road. The only inference I can draw in view of the circumstances is that the Appellant did not pay sufficient attention to his speed and certainly did not drive with the care required of him and accordingly was guilty of driving in a manner dangerous to the public.

I agree with the Public Prosecutor that this section includes negligent driving and driving without due care and attention. It would of course, be better for a distinction to be drawn by separate section but until the legislature so deems it, one has to interpret the section as it stands. In this case it cannot be said that the Respondent was driving other than with the care required of him because as I stated he would have been unable to see the Appellant's car until he was close to the intersection on his left. The Appellant also would not have been able to see the approach of the Respondent until he actually entered the major road in view of the bamboo hedge around the house to his right as he entered the major road. As there is a duty placed on him under the circumstances to take greater care in his driving until he could see along the major road to his right on entering the same and as he collided with the Respondent's vehicle on the opposite side of the major road near the Houstalet, the only conclusion the learned Magistrate could reach was that the Appellant:-

(1) did not enter the major road with care and
(2) did not pay attention to his speed when entering the major road and was therefore correctly convicted of the offence as charged.

Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal.

In my opinion, this was a bad case of the Appellant paying little or no attention to other road users and I therefore do not consider the sentence in any way excessive.

Dated this 9th day of November, 1984.

FREDERICK G. COOKE
CHIEF JUSTICE