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Supreme Court of Vanuatu |
ass="MsoBodyText2Text2" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
HELD AT PORT VILA
(Civil Jurisdiction)
Civil Case No. 68 of 2001
BETWEEN:
JURIS & REBEKAH OZOLS
(Plaintiffs)
AND:
ass="MsoBoMsoBodyText2" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> CYCLAMEN LIMITED
(First Defendant)
AND:
PORT VILA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
(Second Defendant)
AND:
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
(Third Defendant)
AND:
(Fourth Defendant)
AND:
ATTORNEY GL
(Fifth Defendant)
JUDGEMENT
The plaintiffs live in an called Sea-Side. The. Their house and garden are at the edge of the Lagoon. On the south side are residential properties. To the north there was a vacant plot and residential properties beyond. The first defendant bought the vacant plot and plans to run a tourist resort on it. The plaintiffs object to that. The second, third and fourth defendants have dealt with the formalities and applications for such a venture.
The plaintiffs say the various approvals granted e first defendant were obtained by stealth and subterubterfuge. There were misleading statements and an utilisation of permissions obtained thereby to acquire further approvals. They say the first defendant has failed to follow proper procedures, and indeed began building works in the face of clear official instructions to the contrary. The three shareholders in the first defendant are Andrew and Debra Hogarth and the former�s brother Stuart Hogarth. Mr. and Mrs. Hogarth have been carrying out the work for the first defendant Cyclamen Ltd.
The plaintiffs further say that the second dant, the Port Vila Municipal Council, wrongly granted the the approvals to the first defendant. In particular, they say the �zoning� for this part of Port Vila is residential. The first defendant�s activities are commercial. When a Physical Planning Area is declared under the Physical Planning Act (CAP 193) the Council must �consider the welfare of the people in the area affected and of the people of Vanuatu generally�; (section 2 (2) (b)) and �(c) shall ensure that persons affected by the proposed declaration have been given adequate notice of it, and that those people are given an opportunity to make representations to the Council�.
The plaintiffs say if consultation is required to decl Physical Planning Area, then whether or not there isre is specific provision in the Act, consultation must be required to change it. In any event the plaintiffs say such consultation should take place, especially given the density of the proposals for this piece of land. Further, they say the second, third and fourth defendant should have consulted with one another.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> There was complaint that a foreshore development proposal was misleading and the applications not in accordance with the Foreshore Development Act. The plaintiffs also say the building permit and plans are invalid, as being ambiguous.
lass="MsoBoMsoBodyText2" align="left" style="text-align: left; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> The plaintiffs seek declarations in accordance with their arguments, particularly as far as the validity of the applications are concerned and also that the land remains residential. They seek restraining orders until all applications have been made and approvals given, or refused in accordance with the law.
The first defendants reject this. They say there has never been an intention to mislead or operate by stealth. They say all the proper procedures have been followed and the requisite approvals obtained or applied for.
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> The second defes reject the plaintiffs� submissions in so far as they affect the Council. They say say that when a careful and proper examination is made of all the relevant documents there has been no change of �use� or �zone�. All matters have been dealt with properly and in accordance with the law, regulation and practice.
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> I have the affidavits of Rebekah Ozolsd 14th and 28th December 2001, the he affidavits of Andrew Hogarth, 18th December 2001 and 14th February 2002, Stanley John 27th February 2002, Levi Tarosa 27th Februray( in two parts), Madeleine Tom 8th February and Sylvie Lowen, 28th February 2002, and the second defendant�s answers to the first defendants� Interrogatories. I have heard the oral evidence and cross-examination of Juris Ozols who adopted his wife�s affidavits, Douglas Patterson, Sylvie Lowen, Andrew Hogarth, Stanley John, Dick Abel, Chris Ioan and Levi Tarosa.
On 21st December 2001 I issued interim orders restraining the parties from anyher actions in respecespect of the land. An undertaking as to damages was required from the plaintiffs concerning any loss as a result of the Orders. Various directions were given for the speedy progress of the case.
The lease of the fi defendant�s land is residential. If a tourist resort is to be operated it will hill have to be surrendered and a new, commercial lease granted. There is no dispute about that.
Section 4 Physical Panning Act (Cap 193)states �No persall carry on development in a Physical Planning Area,Area, except as specified in the declaration of that Physical Planning Area, without having first received permission in writing from the Council�.
Section 7 (1) states �Where application is made to the Council for permission to develop, the Council may grant permission�� or may refuse permission, and in dealing with any such application the Council shall have regard to the plan in force and any other material consideration.�
Stanley John in his affidavit produced a copy of the Port Vila Physical Plan, 1987 (Annexure F). Paragraph 10.6 to 10.20 and the appendices set out the zoning That shews the land of the plaintiffs and the first defendants designated as �Open Space�. That designation covers a considerable stretch alongside the lagoon where there are residential houses.
Mr. John stated in evidence that when plans are submitted for approval it is the Councils� practice to follow Bye-Law 9/79. The attached colour plan (Annexure B) shews the Land in question coloured green, zone A.
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Part 1 of th-law described zone A as �Residential and Tourist Areas�.
It continues,
�All building in A ashall be, following rules laid down in Parts II and Iand III detached houses used as residences and their buildings, or buildings for the tourist industry,�
�Hotels may be built as detached hous not provided that they arey are of international standard.�
p class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> �Any other type of builis prohibited.
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> �No building may be permitted which may cause any ki nuisance such as noise, sme, smoke, smell, unpleasant waste etc.�
�Commercialdings such as bars, snack bars, cafes, night clubs anbs and cinemas, and generally any business for the amusement of the public or operating at night and likely to annoy neighbours shall be prohibited.�
On 8th February 2001 the second defendant gave approval for a �Tourist resort� art� at Central First Lagoon. At paragraph 4 the approval stated �The use of the building shall be confined to Class 12 of the Use Classes defined in Section 1 of the Physical Planning Act No. 22 of 1986�
Class 12 is set out in section 1, the interpretation section, of the Act,
It must be noted that Retailing hod and retailing liquor are found under different classes, nes, namely (2) and (3).
The Council confined the approv class 12. That was consistent with existing zone A use. e. Therefore for planning purposes, and in particular the Physical Planning Act, there was no change of use, or grant of an approval inconsistent with current zoning.
There is tore no need for me to decide whether or not there is an implied requirement for the cthe council to consult if an approval is granted which is inconsistent with the physical plan. This also means that the Interim Orders were made on a partly incorrect factual basis.
In many jurisdictions, whether or not there is a change of zone or use, planning legion requires a varietyriety of notifications and consultations before an approval can be given. This will generally include the owners and occupiers of land neighbouring the site of the proposed development. No specific provision in any law of Vanuatu has been cited to me requiring such notification and consultation.
The plaintiffs allege the various vals have been obtained by stealth or subterfuge. I considensider this in detail.
The plaintiffs say outline permi was obtained for 12 units when the first defendants had inad in mind 36 or more units. It was on the basis of that approved 12 that the Minister agreed to the surrender of the residential lease with a view to the issue of a commercial one. Indeed the application for foreign investment approval and the approval mention 30 � 40 units (AnnexAJH/4, Mr. Hogarth�s affidavit of 18 December 2001).
Between outline and full permission the number was increased from 12 to 18 and tministration block chck changed from two to three storeys. The plaintiffs say some of the plans for the full permission clearly shew a two storey administration block.
Mr. Hogarth responded that the Investment plan was a projectior ten years, not two, the vthe validity of any planning approval. The first accommodation block was always the same size. It was just that six of the original twelve units were doubles, but had been changed to singles, thus adding the six to bring the number from 12 to 18. He says the plaintiffs must have been aware of 18 units when one reads their letter to Mr. and Mrs. Malcolm of 22nd March 2001, (p 35 Affidavit Mrs. Tom).
I can find nothing untoward in he first defendant applying for outline permission. It is a is a standard procedure when an investor or developer wishes to ascertain if he or she will receive permission for the kind of development in mind before expending time and money preparing detailed plans for full permission. Section 6 of the Act states such permission is �subject to the subsequent grant of permission by the Council for those details but the grant of permission by the Council in respect of those details shall be required before any development is begun.�
There is no reason in law why the first defendants coul make a full application, which was different from thom the outline. The duty is on the Council to consider that full application and grant or refuse it or grant it with terms or modifications. This they did. There is reference in the full plans to a bar and restaurant and conference centre. The approval was limited to Class 12 �Boarding or guest house, or an hotel providing sleeping accommodation�.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Were the plans submitted for the full application misleading? To the exthat the administration blon block is shewn in cross-section as two storey it was misleading (p 106, affidavit of Madeline Tom). One of the floor plans of the administration block is misleading, (p 108). It shews two floors. The accommodation block is shewn as 12 units (p 107). That was misleading, concerning the numbers of units, but not its overall size. The rest of the plans are consistent with a three story administration block and an 18 unit accommodation block, in particular pages 116 and 117 shew the three storey administration block. The fee, based on floor area, is consistent with a three storey accommodation block.
It would appear the first defendant submitted the plans for the outline permissp. 61-63) along with with those for the full permission. A fresh �sectional view� plan and a fresh �aerial view� should have been submitted and the original accommodation block floor plan omitted, or marked as redundant.
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> The second defes, faced with this state of affairs, should have sought clarification. Much of the he confusion and assertions as to what was granted has stemmed from this.
The question must therefore be asked, what did the Council grant approval foris the position so co confused that the approval granted is fundamentally flawed. The first defendants have issued a summons in this regard for a declaration. The second defendant�s counsel argued that it must have been three a storey administration block and 18 units. The first defendants agree with this. The plaintiffs oppose this.
class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Mr. John�s evi, letters and notes upon precisely what was granted are ambivalent,. He has clearly rly found himself trying to reconcile the differences when subject to pressures in opposite directions. I make an assessment independent of his evidence.
The application fee was clearly calculated on the basis of a three storey accommodation block. The sewerage system plan envisages 45 � 50 persons, (p.93 Madeline Tom). Nothing has been adduced in evidence to suggest that the height or positioning of a three storey accommodation block is inconsistent with any laws or bye-laws e.g. Part II, No. 9/97.
In practical terms there is little difference whether the accommodation block is for 12 units or 18. The overall size is the same, the number of people on site at any time is unlikely to vary by more than a few, the sewerage system is sufficient, and the difference in detriment, if any, to neighbouring properties is small.
It should be noted that page 3 of the Hogarth�s Business Plan, dated 26 June 2000 referred to a stage one with twel twelve rooms, six being 36 square metres and six being 72 square metres. It is these latter that Mr. Hogarth said were changed to twelve single units bringing the total up from 12 to 18.
The administration block is now larger than the original proposal. It contains space bar, restaurant etc etc which would need further approvals to be operated as such. However, there is no evidence before me to say that the height, size or positioning of the block exceeds the limits stipulated in any law or bye-law for this zone of land. Given the fact that a perusal of the Council�s files would shew pages 106-8 were the same as the outline plans, that page 109-120 clearly contemplated a three story block, particularly pages 111-113, and 115-116 and 119, I find the Council gave approval for a three storey administration block and 18 units accommodation block.
The piff seeks a declaration that the building permit and plans are invalid by reason of of their ambiguity and otherwise. There are certainly gaps in the proposals that were approved, for example sound proofing and outer wall cladding.
I consider the evidence of Ioan and Abel and the plans themselves. I find that overall there is sufficient detail and clarity for the permit to be valid. The lack of some details does not invalidate the whole. However, there is such a lack on significant features, e.g. any sound proofing requirements and the colour and material of outer wall cladding, that further building permit approval should be obtained from the Council before such parts of the work are commenced.
Consent to the surrender of the lease of this land with a view of creating a new Commercial Tourism lease title was given by the Minister on 31st October 2000.
The Minister has not issued a new lease. He is awaiting the reof the Environment Unit cont concerning the impact of the proposed foreshore reclamation and the outcome of these proceedings, (Affidavit of Levi Tarosa dated 27 February, paragraph 8 and 9). Mr. Patterson, on behalf of the first defendants has sought a negotiators certificate in respect of the land it is proposed to reclaim. The first defendants have yet to conclude their foreshore reclamation application.
It is a matter for the various authorities to make their ion concerning the reclamation. It is for the Ministenister of Lands in the light of this judgment and the reclamation decision to decide whether or not to grant a negotiators certificate and what, if any, new lease or leases.
Complaintmade by the plaintiffs that the Minister�s consent to surrender was obtained on the the misleading basis of a 12 unit development. He can now make his decision based on an 18 unit development of the same overall accommodation size and an enlarged administrative block and in the knowledge of the first defendants� long term proposals. If the first defendant were to propose another block or any other expansion, then all the requisite authorities will need to be obtained.
It would certainly have dispelled fears of deception had the medium and long term plans of the first defendants been made known when application was made to surrender the lease. I need not decide whether that invalidates the Minister�s decision given the course of events.
lass="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Having reviewed all the evidence I cannot find it has been shewn that thet defendants embarked upon a course of deception and misleading actions to obtain what they wanted. However, in many ways much of the misunderstanding in this case might have been avoided with better handling of affairs e.g. approaching neighbouring land owners to inform them what is happening (this might not be done on the basis it gives people time to protest, in the long run it is effective), ensuring clear and unequivocal plans were submitted, ensuring that if plans are changed and expanded everyone involved is made aware. They must also ensure that no building work continues until all the requisites are complied with. I particularly refer to Levi Tarosa�s letter of 9th October 2001.
The position of the plaintiffs and first defendants has not been assisted by the confusing answers emanating from the second defendants concerning what plans have been approved. A large measure of the friction in this case stems from that.
In making my findings herein I have not taken any regard of the evidence of Sylvie Lowen. It emerged in the evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Ozols are not in fact the owners of the neighbouring land, but occupiers. That fact has not changed my approach to this case.
Accordingly I refuse the declaration and orders sought by the plaintiffs. I makeclaration in accordanordance with the terms of paragraph 1 of the first defendants� summons of 15 February. I remove the interim Orders made on 21st December 2001.
Having read this judgment I invited submissions on cost indicated to the parties that I was considering maki making no order as to costs given my findings generally and specifically in relation to the conduct of each party. The plaintiffs were content with this, the first defendants argued that costs should follow the event, there was delay and any short comings of the first defendants were not such that would change the usual rule of costs following the event. The second defendants also sought costs against the plaintiffs, especially as the Interim Orders were made on a partly incorrect factual basis. They argued that there was no real reason why the second defendants should have been brought into the proceedings.
I find that the second defendants shpay their own costs. Whilst I found there was no need for for the Court to decide the question of consultation, the confusion about what permissions had been granted was a major source of the friction in this case. The Council must also consider whether it is a wise practice to allow an applicant for planning approval to transport the documents from department to department. Efficiency is always a laudable aim. In this case the application was lodged on 1st February. It had been around all departments and approved by the 8th February.
It is a difficult decision as o whether the first defendant should pay its own costs or t or the plaintiffs should do so. I have referred to what might have been better practice and handling of matters by the first defendants. However, as a matter of law they have followed the prescribed procedures and sought the required permissions as far as matters germane to this judgment are concerned. In those circumstances costs should follow the event and I order the plaintiffs to pay the first defendants costs. I have considered the question of costs between the plaintiffs and second defendants and the first and second defendants. I make no order in those regards
Dated at Port Vila this 8th day of March 2002.
class="MsoNormal" align="cgn="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">R.J. COVENTRY
Judge
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