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Regina v Koito [1966] PGLawRp 24; [1967-68] PNGLR 217 (16 December 1966)

Papua New Guinea Law Reports - 1967-68

[1967-68] PNGLR 217 - Regina v Koito-Gaocatai

[1967-68] PNGLR 217

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

REGINA

V.

KOITO-GAOCATAI

Port Moresby

Frost J

14-16 December 1966

CRIMINAL LAW - Evidence - Identity - Breaking and entering - Palm print found in broken premises.

Under the common law of England, the rules and principles of which for the time being apply in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea evidence of fingerprints or palm prints alone is sufficient evidence of identity to support a conviction.

R. v. Castleton (1909), 3 Cr.App.R. 74; R. v. Blacker [1910] NSWStRp 27; (1910), 10 S.R. (N.S.W.) 357; R. v. Parker[1912] ArgusLawRp 24; , [1912] V.L.R. 152; R. v. Morris, [1914] Q.S.R. 274; Parker v. The King [1912] HCA 29; (1912), 14 C.L.R. 681, considered.

Evidence to support a charge of breaking entering and stealing established that the store in question had been broken and entered through a slat, and that articles had been stolen. The only evidence identifying the accused with the crime was that of a police fingerprint expert who swore his opinion to be that a palm print found on one of the slats was identical with portion of the accused�s left palm print, whilst another police officer swore that when interrogated the accused had maintained that he had never been, on any occasion, in the store.

Held:

That upon the whole of the evidence, that is to say, evidence from which an inference can be drawn, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused who broke and entered the premises and stole therein.

Criminal Trial.

An indictment containing two counts was presented charging Koito-Gaocatai first, with breaking and entering a store and stealing therein, and second, with breaking and entering that store with intent to commit a crime therein. The only evidence identifying the accused with the crime was the opinion evidence of a fingerprint expert identifying portion of the accused�s left palm print with a print found upon a slat through which the store was entered. Further facts appear hereafter in the reasons for judgment.

Counsel:

Smith, with him Ilze Grastins, for the Crown.

Luke, for the accused.

Cur. adv. vult.

16 December 1966

FROST J:� This case comes before me as a judge sitting alone upon an indictment containing two counts, first, that the accused man broke and entered a store and stole therein, and second, that he broke and entered a store with intent to commit a crime therein.

Upon arraignment he pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. There was ample evidence that on 23rd May, 1966, the premises of Steamships Trading Company in Champion Parade, Port Moresby, were broken into and articles stolen. The sole issue is identity, that is whether it was the accused man who committed the crime.

Upon this issue the only evidence tendered by the Crown was that the accused man�s palm print had been found upon one of the slats above a stairway which had been pushed aside and through which, the evidence established, entry had been made. The accused man was interrogated by Sub-Inspector Fisk on 7th December, 1966, and he maintained that he had never on any occasion been in the shop.

The expert evidence was given by Inspector N. H. Simmonds, who is the Officer-in-Charge of the Criminal Investigation Branch at Konedobu. His qualifications as an expert were unchallenged. He is a member of the Central Fingerprints Bureau, Criminal Investigation Branch, Sydney; he has had over twelve years� fingerprint experience and during that time he has prepared and identified many thousands of fingerprints. As a member of the New South Wales Police Force, he has given evidence in court in New South Wales on many occasions where he was accepted as a fingerprint expert. He described the fingerprint method which involves identification of persons by means of the details or characteristics of the papillary or friction ridges of the inner surfaces of the fingers, palms of the hands or soles of the feet, the patterns of which are unique to each individual person.

Inspector Simmonds gave evidence that he took a set of the accused�s fingerprints and palm prints, that is, prints of all fingers and of both palms. Upon examination he found that portion of the palm prints, as photographed and which had been found by Sub-Inspector Davis on one of the slats, was identical with portion of the impression of the accused�s left palm print. He found thirty points of identity between a portion of the accused�s left palm print and the palm print found on the slats. Usually sixteen points of identity are considered sufficient. Fingerprint impressions were also found on the slats, but when he examined the finger impressions of the accused, Inspector Simmonds found them unsatisfactory for exhibit purposes, as these impressions showed gaps, due probably to hard manual work done by the accused, which would preclude the obtaining of sufficient points of identity.

Inspector Simmonds said that, whilst it was true that fingerprints were more generally used for personal identification, this was for convenience. Fingerprints were more convenient to examine than palm prints because fingerprints offer more scope for classification, but the patterns of the palms or soles of the feet are as individual as a fingerprint.

Mr. Luke for the accused has submitted to me that in the absence of any evidence of investigation for palm prints or fingerprints upon those portions of the premises from which articles were taken, the value of the evidence as to the palm print upon the slat is much weakened, and that the latter was insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was identical with the person who committed the crime.

An examination of the authorities and the practice in the courts of England and Australia show that it is well established that a jury is entitled to act upon fingerprint evidence as connecting the accused with the crime, although such fingerprint evidence is the sole evidence.

The first reported case in England is Castleton v. The King[cclxxx]¹. That was an appeal from a refusal to grant leave to appeal against a conviction for burglary. The only evidence against the appellant was that of fingerprints on a candle left behind. The Lord Chief Justice in giving judgment said:

�We are clearly of opinion that this application must be dismissed. The suggestion has been made that these fingerprints may have been put there by someone else, but that suggestion was disposed of by the jury, who decided upon the evidence before them. Our attention has been drawn to the photographs of the impressions of the fingerprints. Looking at the middle finger particularly, as well as to the index finger of the right hand, we agree with the evidence of the expert at the trial�[cclxxxi]². Fingerprint evidence has been considered in various States of Australia; see R. v. Blacker[cclxxxii]³; R. v. Parker[cclxxxiii]⁴; R. v. Morris [No. 2][cclxxxiv]⁵. It is also considered by the High Court in Parker v. The King[cclxxxv]⁶. The judgment is quite brief and is as follows:

�We think that leave must be refused. We are asked to allow the point to be argued whether, when evidence of fingerprints is the only evidence of identity, it is sufficient to support a conviction. Leave is asked in the hope that the rule may be laid down that it is not. Signatures have been accepted as evidence of identity as long as they have been used. The fact of the individuality of the corrugations of the skin on the fingers of the human band is now so generally recognized as to require very little, if any, evidence of it, although it seems to be still the practice to offer some expert evidence on the point. A fingerprint is therefore in reality an unforgeable signature. That is now recognized in a large part of the world and in some parts has, I think, been recognized for many centuries. It is certainly now generally recognized in England and other parts of the British Dominions. If that is so, there is in this case evidence that the prisoner�s signature was found in the place which was broken into, and was found under such circumstances that it could only have been impressed at the time when the crime was committed. It is impossible under those circumstances to say there was no evidence to go to the jury�[cclxxxvi]⁷.

Thus under the common law of England, the rules and principles of which for the time being apply in this Territory, where the only evidence of identity is the evidence of fingerprints or palm prints, that is sufficient to support a conviction.

It is, therefore, open to me to find as a judge sitting alone, upon the whole of the evidence, that is to say, evidence from which an inference can be drawn, beyond reasonable doubt, that entry was made by the intruder pushing aside the slats above the stairway and the evidence of the palm prints, identical with those of the accused, found on one of those slats, although that was the sole evidence connecting the accused with the crime, that it was the accused man who broke and entered the premises and stole therein, and upon all the facts of this case I am so satisfied reasonable doubt.

The prisoner is accordingly convicted under the first count.

Verdict: Guilty of breaking entering and stealing.

Note: Since delivering this judgment I have seen references in standard textbooks to the use of palm prints. See Battley, Single Finger Prints, Finger Print Bureau, New Scotland Yard, (1930), pp. 68 et seq.; Henry, Classification and Uses of Finger Prints, (1934), p. 18.

Solicitor for the Crown: S. H. Johnson, Crown Solicitor.

Solicitor for the accused: W. A. Lalor, Public Solicitor.