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State v Inom [1981] PGNC 11; N329 (24 February 1981)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N329

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
THE STATE
VERSUS
LASTIN INOM

Goroka

Quinlivan AJ
9 February 1981
[Illegible Data] February 1981
24 February 1981

CRIMINAL LAW - “dangerous driving causing death”; - need for some “fault” on part of accused. - procedure - Statement of Facts for purpose of Plea; - Clear remedying of deficiency in what appears in the depositions; - Question of whether plea of guilty should be rejected when extra evidence is clearly available to remedy deficient deposition.

QUINLIVAN AJ: In this case the accusechaf charged with the offence known as “dangerous driving causing death”. It is the second of three such charges brought before me at this Sittings am still not used to the charge itself in the sense that, hat, when I was at the Bar the charge, in cases such as these, was either manslaughter or, if “gross, culpable, criminal negligence” could not be alleged, the Prosecution had to be satisfied with one of the Motor Traffic charges. I presume that much of my worry about this charge arises out of sheer newness but, as I shall explain part of it arises from the difficulty of seeing just what the actual “fault” was that the Court is being asked to punish the accused person for.

The difficulty in the first caseN329.html#_edn655" title="">[dclv]¹ was in regard to the that that the co-owners of the vehicle - and they were equally culpable with the driver, if not more so (a matter which I will be dealing with when I deal with State v. KEGIYO BAISON329.html#_edn656" title="">[dclvi]² later today) ld, apparentlyently, not be dealt with and this present a sentencing Judge with a problem in the sense of “abstract justice.” The difficulty in this is quite different and it is, I feel, capable of relativeltively easy solution. In fact, it arises out of the same sort of problem which I mentioned as being particularly important in this country when I was dealing with the voir dire in State v. WESLEY MOLGIMEN329.html#_edn657" title="">[dclvii]³ . It also reinforces w whic which I tentatively put forward in State v. KE MI BOMAIN329.html#_edn658" title=clviii]⁴ so I feet I should explain lain it here.

In accordance ance with The Papua New Guinea Procedure for Taking a Plea (which I have described elsewhere) I satisfied myself- from what Mr. Darius, the learned State Prosecutor, told me of the facts which he would be able to prove if the case were to go to trial- that each of the elements of the offence was covered and I then explained the charge, on the basis of that coverage of the elements, to the accused. From what I myself explained to him and from what he himself then said I was satisfied (if I may paraphrase the definition of Lord Morris in “S” (an infant) v. Manchester City RecorderN329.html#_edn659" title="">[dclix]⁵ that this accused was fund and freely, and with understanding of what was involved in so doing, admitting the offence as charged.

I announced that it appeared to me that the accused was admitting that he, through his own fault, had been driving dangerously when the car toppled over the cliff and that his wife died as a result of the car toppling over the cliff due to his fault. Counsel for both sides agreed with this but, to make assurance doubly sure, I then asked Mr. Miva, learned Counsel for the defence (who had a supervising Master Solicitor with him) whether it was safe to accept the admission and he said that it was. In fact, of course, I had already been told by the Public Solicitor’s representatives both at the Waigani call-over and at Goroka that this was a case in which a plea of guilty would be made “on advice” but I always check with Counsel in case there has been a change in the instructions which they have received.

I mention all this, not because of any wish to off-load responsibility on to Counsel - I have accepted that responsibility many thousands of times in other “accused-shattering” jurisdictions - but because of what happened next. And because what I am now saying is by way of prelude to what I have written for delivery in State v KEGIYO BAISON329.html#_edn660" title="">[dclx]⁶ later toda>

The field ofld of “dangerous driving causing death” is, as I have said, a totally new one to me and, because of this, I had taken the precaution of looking up the authorities on it. Thus, when Mr. Darius advised that “the facts” were that Accused had been at a MUMU party where a large number of people had consumed one carton of 24 half bottles of beer over a long period; that they

“had been drinking beer until 10.30 p.m. (but) from 10.30 to midnight they were just talking. Then he decided to drive home. On the way he lost control of the vehicle. It ran to the side of the road and toppled over the cliff (killing his wife who was a passenger)”,

I knew that, in R. v. DRUETTN329.html#_edn661" title="">[dclxi]⁷ Ollerw J. had said that acct accused’s

“unexplained failure to observe the embankment or its proximity, in my view, undoubtedly would be culpable gence within the meaning of the authorities”

(

(and, as the first words of the next paragraph of his judgment make clear, his Honour was making this observation regardless of whether or not the driver was under the influence of alcohol or some other drug - or that he was sleeping or his control was temporarily overborne for some other reason).

Personally (and with great respect) I felt that his Honour had gone too far for that to be manslaughter but I noted that, in State v. ELIAS SUBANIN329.html#_edn662" title="">[dclxii]⁸ Saldanha J. had adopted this statement as sufficient for a case of DANGEROUS DRIVING CAUSING DEATH and, in HENDERSON v. JONESN329.html#_edn663" title="">[dclxiii]⁹ the CourAppeal in Englandglandgland held that even if the loss of control is due to falling asleep, it is “dangerous driving” - as, if one looks at the matter from the purely objective poi view, is obvious. As the sthe same court said in R. v. EVANSN329.html#_edn664" title="">[dclxiv]¹⁰ nearn years later (and this this statement has been adopted time and time again, and in many countries):

“It is quite clear from the reported cases that, if a man adopts a manner of driving which the jury thinks was dangerous to other road users in all the circumstances, then on the issue of guilt it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, momentarily inattentive or [illegible data] his incompetent best.”N329.html#_edn665" title="">[dclxv]^{11 &#/sup>(my emphasis).}

That quotation continues on to say that each of the causes of danger listed would, of course (although irrelevant as regards the test of guilt) be

&#8220ly relevant if it ever come comes to sentence, and equally relevant in the mind of any person who has to consider whether a prosecution is justified or not”N329.html#_edn666" title="">[dclxvi]¹²

and I will return to this in a moment because it becomes vitally important. Curiously enough, it was a matter which I dealt with in my first appeal, that of MICHAEL DAI KAUPAN329.html#_edn667" title="">[dclxvii]¹³

It was because of these cases that, as I have said, I considered that all the elements of the offence had been covered. But the sum total of the information before me, although it complied with the objective test, disturbed me because it seemed to offend against the basic principle so superbly stated by Windeyer J in the Papua New Guinea “leading case” of Appeal of TIMBU KOLIANN329.html#_edn668" title="">[dclxviii]¹⁴ in these words:

“In general, criminal responsibility is today attached to moral blame. And according to deeply rooted beliefs blame-worthiness does not depend simply on what a man did, or on the results his actions caused. It depends upon his knowledge and his intentions when he acted - or upon his advertence to the possible consequences of what he was doing or about to do, or his careless ignoring of them. That of course is trite. The doctrines of mens rea in the common law and of dole in the law of Scotland express this element in guilt. I see no reason for thinking that (the Code) demands any departure from this basic concept or that it at all attenuates it.”N329.html#_edn669" title="">[dclxix]¹⁵

I will explain what I mean in more detail in the judgment which I will be delivering in State v. KEGIYO BAISON329.html#_edn670" title="">[dclxx]¹⁶ later today. The reaso I am I am detailing the history of this case is totally different. But the fact that, as Windeyer J. says, the necessity for sorm of “fault” is trite (self-obvious) remains.

The reason why I am dealidealing with the problem of this case separately derives, in fact, from the second part of the quotation which I made above from the EVANS CASE in EnglandN329.html#_edn671" title="">[dclxxi]¹⁷ and from an observawhich I ch I made in State v. WESLEY MOLGIMEN329.html#_edn672" title="">[dclxxii]¹⁸. It arises from the that I read the depositions in this case and, as the situatituation was in KEMI BOMAIN329.html#_edn673" title="">[dclxxiii]¹⁹, so it was in this. The depositions, as they exist on the National Court file (and I note that they do not include the Statement of Defendant - but, since it is clear that he reserved his defence, this does not matter), do not support the Statement of Facts as supplied to me for the purpose of taking the plea in accordance with The Papua New Guinea Procedure.

And, of course, it is important that we note that there is no reason why, in every case, they should. Although, in the report of In re. EMMANUEL LAVAKIN329.html#_edn674" title="">[dclxxiv]²⁰ I ed out that the Public Pric Prosecutor may lay any charge “that the evidence appears to him to warrant”, there is nothing to require him to confine himself to the depositions. Provided he supplies the accused, a reasonable time before the trial (if there is to be one) with a copy of what a new witness will say, it is perfectly proper for him to go out and seek to remedy evidentiary deficiencies rather than to put the accused (and the State, and the witnesses) through the trauma and expense of multiple Preliminary Inquiries. In fact, it is his duty to do so.

That, quite clearly, is what happened in this case. I actually read the depositions to see if they disclosed (contrary to the implications in Mr. Darius’ summary of facts) that the accused was “under the influence” at the time. The depositions make it clear that he was not - “there were plenty of people who were drinking out of the carton” - but they also indicate that the actual particulars which comply with what I might call “the rule in Pieutt’s Case and Subani’s Case”N329.html#_edn675" title="">[dclxxv]²¹ come from some source.

I repeat that this is perfectly proper. I can do no more than quote the following from the Instruction for Crown Prosecutors which I myselfed in 1960, paragraph “C” of which reads:

“The pre-trial vetting will be done at the earliest possible time ... Here it is important to remember that

(i) & a60; although it may well be that in certain instances the solicitor doing the pre-trial vetting may be the ... prosecutor rostered for the sittings at which the case be trhe shnot retainfile as if it were, at that shat stage,tage, his his briefbrief, but should

(a) &##160;; thor>thoroughlyughly vet it to see whether any (and if so, what) further evidence might properly be obtained;

(b) ;ټ ;

(c) a kebmisuion ...o whethe lthe laying of any charge should be declined if there is doubt as to the possibiliibility orty or propriety of laying a charge.”

Bu pointhat,ng ree depositions, the the faultfault-lade-laden matn matters ters which the accused so freely admitted to me in Open Court are found to be missing. Does this mean that I should vacate the VERDICT which I have announced? According to the Papua New Guinea Procedure of which we should all be proud, we have never had the inhibitions which the House of Lords spoke about in “S” (an infant) v. Manchester City RecorderN329.html#_edn676" title="">[dclxxvi]²² so I would vacate the plthowithout the slightest hesitation if I thought that that was either wise or necessary - and, in fact, out of the first two defendants presented before me on what were said to be “plea cases” I, in fact, sent one back for a full trial because of what the accused himself said - not because of what was in or not in the depositions - even though I had, originally, announced a VERDICT OF GUILTY ON PLEA. But is it wise or necessary that I do it in this case?

This brings me to the observation which I made in my Ruling on the Voir Dire in State v. WESLEY MOLGIMEN329.html#_edn677" title="">[dclxxvii]²³ that

“this co ntry needs to see its lawyers strengthened, not demoralized”

Before I deal with this, however, I must first dispose of the question of whether it oper (or “necessary”) that I do change the plea plea because, if I should, in law, do so then, of course, I will.

Logically, there is no reason why I should vacate the verdict which I have announced. By his admitting all the elements the accused has made the calling of witnesses unnecessary. And on what we call “principle”, there is no reason either. As Hawkins saysN329.html#_edn678" title="">[dclxxviii]²⁴ (and as Lord Parker C.ceptecepted in Appeal of ColeN329.html#_edn679" title="">[dclxxix]²⁵):“An express confession is where a person directly confesses crime with which he is c is charged, which is the highest conviction that can be”

Why, then, one might ask, does the practice of reading the depositions exist? Before we can answer this we have to be clear on several points. In my first case in this jurisdiction (that is,, State v. KEMI BOMAIN329.html#_edn680" title="">[dclxxx]²⁶) I asked counsel what the usual practice was because, naturally, - as I explained when I adopted the “usual practice for the holding of the particular type of voir dire that arose in State v. WESLEY MOLGIMEN329.html#_edn681" title="">[dclxxxi]²⁷ - I wantedollow it. A new jnew judge is bound to follow in the footsteps laid down for him. But counsel advised that there was no “usual practice”; that some judge caused the whole of the depositions to be read out in Open Court, some read them themselves and took notes from them, some appeared only to glance at them, some asked only to see the Police Record of Interview and some did nothing at that stage, relying on “provisional plea” and the Blandford Justices Case. Since the duty of deciding whether it is safe to accept a particular plea is purely a personal one, and the practice in different jurisdictions is quit different, I could see that this was not unexpected but I announce that the problem of the “deficient” set of depositions caused me concern and since I wished to have “certainty” in all things done in court, I would have to wait to see which procedure I would follow.

I must not be misunderstood here. Although it is well known that I have, ever since I discovered, in 1978, that The Papua New Guinea Procedure for the Taking of a Plea was no longer being taught to magistrates, been campaigning for its reinstatement, this is not what is involved here, except in an incidental and residual way. I sincerely hope that the wisdom of those who created that procedure will be appreciated but, beyong pointing out (as I wrote for the Law Reform Commission/Magisterial Service Seminar of October, 1980) that it is invaluable, I can do nothing. It would now be improper for me to do more than say:

“The Papua New Guinea Procedure was deliberately designed be expert lawyers who loved this country and who spent - each of them - over thirty years here. It complies with the legislation - in fact, it is the explanation for the fact that the legislation here is different from what it is elsewhere - and it suits the needs not only of Papua New Guinea but of the rest of the world. It can be confidently predicted that it will, in 100 years time, be the required procedure in all “advanced” countries using the “English model”, as is evidenced by the James Committee Report of 1975 in England...” (as I said in paragraph 3 of the submission which that Seminar unanimously adopted).

The fact is that, when the use of The Papua New Guinea Procedure for the Taking of a Plea was universal, the judges all adopted the uniform policy of having the prosecutor read out the depositions aloud in Open Court. There was no “variety” in those days, as there is said to be now, in regard to post-plea procedure. The judges had the depositions read out to them and they commented on the inadmissible evidence which they contained and on the other deficiencies - especially those deficiencies which showed that the prosecutor was relying, in his Statement of Facts, on evidence which had been gathered after the committal. It was very much an “in club” affair and it did no harm to anyone. It complied with the statistically important number of cases where it was required by the second paragraph of the then section 600 of the Criminal Code and it allowed the judges to perform the educative role which they regarded as being so important.

From what counsel in KEMI BOMAI said it appears that those days are well and truly over and it is not difficult to see why. In the days when the only people who could understand English were the magistrates who sat in the back of the courtroom, the comments of the judge on the deficiencies of the depositions served a useful purpose and hurt nobody. One could, moreover, be reasonably certain that, at the end of the process, there would be a Statement of Defendant which would indicate, quite clearly, what would be brought out when they proceeded to the next stage, that of The Allocutus. And, if course, it was a procedure which the second paragraph of section 600 of The Criminal Code made mandatory in the, in those days, quite frequent case where the accused had been committed for sentence instead of for trial. Nowadays, however, a Statement by Defendant is so rara as to be almost unheard of and the concept of committal for sentence has disappeared entirely with the result that the statutory provision which required the reading of the depositions in a statistically significant proportion of cases disappeared when the Criminal Code was consolidated just before Independence.

But although times change, the fact is that basic needs and basic principles do not change. The basic need is for the Judge to be able honestly to make the decision which I mentioned at page 2 when I first cited the House of Lords case of “S” (an infant) v. Manchester City RecorderN329.html#_edn682" title="">[dclxxxii]²⁸. That first need is for the Judge to be sure that the accused person is, fully and freely (and with an awareness of what is involved in so doing) admitting all the elements of the offence. The Papua New Guinea Procedure which I always use was designed to make this possible, and it does so admirably. And the point is that, at that stage, there is really no other need that has to be met. As Bray C.J. said in Weaver v. SamuelsN329.html#_edn683" title="">[dclxxxiii]²⁹

“The rule is that if the defendant desires to dispute circumstances of aggravation alleged in the sworn evidence for the prosecution, he must do so by sworn evidence from himself or someone else; but if the aggravating matter is not sworn to, but is only alleged on the one hand and denied on the other in an unsworn form, then it is the duty of the court “to act upon the version of the facts which, within the bounds of reasonable probability, is most favourable to the accused.”

Here we come to an interesting point. Although that passage speaks of “the sworn evidence” and although people speak of the depositions being relied on, the fact is that such a cumbersome process as reading the depositions out is not actually used in the jurisdictions where The Papua New Guinea Procedure is not yet used. As Begg and Cantor JJ. said in R. v. O’NeillN329.html#_edn684" title="">[dclxxxiv]³⁰

“... it is the practice in this State for the Crown to tender in evidence the depositions taken in the court below. A police officer is normally called who gives a condensed hearsay version of the facts upon which the Crown relies. If the accused is represented, his counsel normally cross-examines to bring out aspects favourable to the accused.”

In short, the “sworn evidence” is, in fact, what the policeman says. As I said in the October, 1980 Submission:

“The difference in the procedure is, in theory, a very simple one but the result of that difference is tremendous. The difference is that in The Papua New Guinea Procedure the Prosecutor tells the Court what the facts are that he feels will cover all the elements of the offence. And he does this before the (Court) considers how best he/she can explain the charge to the Defendant; In the New South Wales Procedure the Prosecutor does not say anything until after the Court has announced that it has decided to record a VERDICT OF GUILTY ON PLEA. At that stage - and only then - the Prosecutor reads out a Police document (which he has not prepared) which is called “Satetment of Facts”.

Where (as in New South Wales) the Police have large numbers of highly trained experts who prepare the Statement of Facts for those cases which go before the Courts - and only a proportion of cases go before the Courts because the Station Commander has a duty to sort out those in which there is a deficiency in admissible evidence - the Courts can be assured that, if the Defendant does “plead guilty”, the Statement of Facts will set out the facts which cover all the elements. In Papua New Guinea, however, where the Statement of Facts is usually prepared by the most junior member of the Squad Car, the situation is different.”

That, of course, was written in reference to pleas of guilty in summary cases but the point is the same. If a summary of the evidence on which the prosecution relies is made, the question is, basically, one of who makes it. This brings me back to the second part of the quotation which I made earlier from the English case of R. v. EvansN329.html#_edn685" title="">[dclxxxv]³¹ (whof course, echoes what ahat appears in the 1980 Submission - and what I said in this Court in In re. Emmanuel LavakiN329.html#_edn686" title="">[dclxxxvi]³² and Appe Michael Dai Kaui KaupaN329.html#_edn687" title="">[dclxxxvii]³³):

&;it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, momentarily inattentive or e or even doing his incompetent best. It is highly relevant if it ever comes to sentence, and equally relevant in the mind of any person who has to consider whether a prosecution is justified or not.”N329.html#_edn688" title="">[dclxxxviii]³⁴

Since the Public Prosecutor is vested with the authority to make that latter decision, who better to give the summary of facts on which the State relies than the State Prosecutor to whom he has delegated the carriage of the case? The analogy cannot, of course, be carried to its fullest limits because there could never be any question of cross-examining Counsel but the fact that he or she is an Officer of this Court makes any Statement of Facts (subject to the control mechanisms mentioned by Bray C.J.) fully acceptable.

The point is that, because I was trained to use The Papua New Guinea Procedure when it was clearly mandatory in Magistrates Courts here, I always use it because of its manifest superiority. Other Judges, not so trained, do what they think best. It is - as the voir dire is, as I mentioned in State v. Wesley MolgimeN329.html#_edn689" title="">[dclxxxix]³⁵ - very much a personalematter. As Moffitt A.C.J. said in R. v. O’NeillN329.html#_edn690" title="">[dcxc]³⁶

&#8220ractice, the difficulty will be to supply the answer to theo the question as to what is the acceptable procedure to establish the facts ... The question as to what procedures are appropriate does not appear to have been the subject of any authoritative decision in this State ... The matter has been dealt with in a series of helpful decisions in South Australia”

(and, as I mentioned in State v. Wesley MolgimeN329.html#_edn691" title="">[dcxci]³⁷ the case then goes on to dial with acceptable procedures).

In addition to the needs which such procedures have to meet elsewhere, however, the two cases which I have had in this short period - KEMI BOMAI and this - make it clear that, where The Papua New Guinea Procedure is used, two additional needs (or problems) arise. These do not arise where the indictment is merely read to the accused person in its stiff, legal wording but that is a procedure which I cannot, I am afraid, adopt for reasons which I have explained elsewhere.

The two additional needs are firstly, to make sure that, after the Prosecutor has said that the facts are “this and this and this” the general public is not astonished to hear the depositions making it appear that the facts are quite different. That was the problem in KEMI BOMAI. This case is really an extension of that. And here we have illustrated the need to make sure that, after it is clear to everyone that the accused person is both guilty and pleading guilty, I do not have to say: “But the depositions are deficient”.

To meet these needs - and I repeat that they arise solely because I must continue to adopt The Papua New Guinea Procedure - I would like it known that (subject, of course, to correction) I will not, in the normal, ordinary, case, read the depositions if I am satisfied that the accused person is fully and freely admitting the facts which cover each of the elements of the charge. And, since I do not read them they should not be included in the Record of this Court.

If, however, Counsel for either side wish to point to some particular part (or aspects) of the record of the lower court, that is entirely a different matter. To mention but two instances - if the accused person had made an exculpatory statement to the police or if there are circumstances of aggravation which were not really relevant to the Satetment of Facts (although this latter would be rather difficult to imagine) - then, of course, they may do so and the normal rules would apply if there is any contest on the point.

Solicitor for the State: L. Gavara-Nanu, Public Prosecution Public Prosecutor.

Counsel: K. Bona, with him, M. Darius.

Solicitor for the Accused: A. Amet Public Solicitor.

Counsel: M. Miva.

<55">N329.html#_ednref655" title="">[dclv]^{State v. KALAWEPA EPAVE, unreported (as are the following) 5th February.}

N329.hednref656" title="">[dclvi]clvi]^{Unreported, 24 February.}

N329.html#_ednref657" title="">[dclvii]^{No. 328.}

N329.html#_ednref658" title="">[dclviii]^327.

N329.html#_ednref659" title="">[dclix] ^{(1970) 2 W.L.R., 21 at p. 36; (1968) 8 All E.R., 1230 at p. 1242.}

N329.html#_ednref660" title="">[dclx]^{Unreported judgment Goroka [illegible data] 1981.}

N329.html#_ednref661" title="">[dclxi] ^{1965-1966 PNGLR 395.}

N329.html#_ednref662" title="">[dclxii]^{Unreported judgment No. 38.}

N329.html#_ednref663" title="">[dclxiii]^{1955 Criminal Law Review p. 318}

N329.html#_ednref664" title="">[dclxiv]^{(1962) 3 All E.R. 1086}

N329.html#_ednref665" title="">[dclxv]^{(1962) 3 All E.R. 1086 p. 1088.}

N329.html#_ednref666" title="">[dclxvi]^{(1962) 3 All E.R. 1086 at p. 1088 line D.}

N329.html#_ednref667" title="">[dclxvii]^{Unreported judgment issued as N. 320.}

N329.html#_ednref668" title="">[dclxviii] ^{1967-1968 PNGLR 320}

N329.html#_ednref669" title="">[dclxix] ^{1967-1968 PNGLR 320 at p. 327.}

N329.html#_ednref670" title="">[dclxx]^{Unreported judgment, Goroka, 24th February, 1981}

N329.html#_ednref671" title="">[dclxxi]^{See above at footnote 12.}

N329.html#_ednref672" title="">[dclxxii]^{See above at 3.}

N329.html#_ednref673" title="">[dclxxiii]^{See above at 4.}

N329.html#_ednref674" title="">[dclxxiv]^{Unreported judgment issued as N. 324.}

N329.html#_ednref675" title="">[dclxxv]^{See above at 7 and 8.}

N329.html#_ednref676" title="">[dclxxvi]^{See above at 5.}

N329.html#_ednref677" title="">[dclxxvii]^{See above at 3.}

N329.html#_ednref678" title="">[dclxxviii]^{2 Hawkins Pleas of the Crown, 8th Ed. p. 466.}

N329.html#_ednref679" title="">[dclxxix] ^{(1965) 2 All E.R. 29 at p. 31.}

N329.html#_ednref680" title="">[dclxxx]^{See above at 4.}

N329.html#_ednref681" title="">[dclxxxi]^{See above at 3.}

N329.html#_ednref682" title="">[dclxxxii]^{See above at 5.}

N329.html#_ednref683" title="">[dclxxxiii] ^{1971 S.A.S.R. 116 at p. 119.}

N329.html#_ednref684" title="">[dclxxxiv] ^{(1979) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 582 at p. 596.}

N329.html#_ednref685" title="">[dclxxxv]^{(1962) 3 All E.R. 1086.}

N329.html#_ednref686" title="">[dclxxxvi]^{Unreported ruling in Chambers, 12 January, 1981, issued as N.324.}

N329.html#_ednref687" title="">[dclxxxvii]^{Unreported judgment, 20 January, 1981, issued as N. 320.}

N329.html#_ednref688" title="">[dclxxxviii] ^{(1962) 2 All E.R. 1086 at p. 1088.}

N329.html#_ednref689" title="">[dclxxxix]^{See above at 3.}

N329.html#_ednref690" title="">[dcxc] ^{(1979) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 582 at p. 588}

N329.html#_ednref691" title="">[dcxci]^{See above at 3.}