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Application of Sir Kepu Pupu [1992] PGNC 15; N1077 (19 June 1992)

Unreported National Court Decisions

N1077

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS NO 97 OF 1992
IN THE MATTER OF S.54 (6) OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES (THIRD PARTY INSURANCE) ACT CH. 295
THE APPLICATION OF SIR KEPA PUPU

Mount Hagen

Woods J
5 June 1992
19 June 1992

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - Notice of Intended ation - personal injuries - motor vehicle accident - notice to Motor vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust - application for extension of time - sufficient cause - Exercise of discretion.

Case Cited

Rundle v M.V.I.T. [1988] PNGLR 20

Counsel

P Dowa for the Applicant.

A Kandakasi for the Respondent.

19 June 1992

WOODS J: This is an application for an extension of time under s.54(6) (b) of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act Ch 295 to give notice of intention to maclaim to the Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust.

Section 54 (6) states:

"Nop>"No action to enforce any claims under this section lies against the Trust unless notice of intention to make a claim is given by the claimant to the Trust within a period of six months after the occurrence out of which the claim arose or within such further period as:

a) ـ҈ t60; the Come Commissioner, or

b) ; The Couft bewhre which theh the action is instd on cient cause being shown, allows.

The Applicant alleges he was struck by a by a vehicvehicle on 29 November 1990 on the Okuk Hi Mounen ansuffered injuriesuries. He . He now wnow wishes to seek damages as a result of the injuries he received. In September 1991 the applicant apparently gave instructions to a lawyer to make a claim for damages. In October 1991 the lawyer wrote to the Insurance Commissioner seeking an extension of time in which to lodge a claim. The application was refused on 18 October 1991. The applicant on 15 May 1992 has filed this application.

The law is quite clear that no claim can be made against the Trust unless notice has been given. And the Parliament having considered all matters relevant has legislated that an original action by a notice must be made within 6 months of the incident. Parliament has accordingly considered that any person in this country would take immediate action to press for compensation following receiving personal injuries fairly soon after an accident and six months would be an appropriate limiting period. Perhaps this would be appropriate considering the propensity for people to be quick to claim damages for any alleged wrong. Such a limitation also allows the Trust to quickly ascertain the history or facts necessary for the proper consideration of the claim before the so-called trail runs cold or while it is still possible to contact people involved whilst their memory of the incident may still be fresh.

The section requires that sufficient cause must be shown before an extension of time is given. The Supreme Court in Rundle v M.V.I.T. [1988] PNGLR 20 said that the power of a court under s.54 (6) to grant an extension of time in which to give notice of intention to make a claim is a discretionary one to be exercised according to proper principles and taking into account all the circumstances of the case.

The reasons given in the request for the extension of time are the applicant is an elderly man who is illiterate and does not understand the provisions of the relevant legislation. The injuries were received in November 1990 but no instructions were given to a lawyer until 10 months later. There is no explanation given as to why in a society where people are very quick to seek compensation for injuries or damage, the applicant or his family made no representation to anybody. It is not necessary to understand legislation to seek compensation. It is a normal reaction in this society. There is no evidence that any claim was made to the company that owned the vehicle or to the driver. There is no evidence of anyone showing any concern for 10 months. It is not as if the applicant was bedridden or unconscious all the time.

There must be some explanation for the lack of any action involving any request or claim for compensation before this court can say that there is a good reason for an extension of time to proceed.

If the Parliament had felt that six months is a reasonable period in which any person whether urban or rural would have done something to press for or seek a claim I must be satisfied there is a good reason for such a delay of 10 months to do anything. I have been given no good reason. I am not saying that because he is an old man who lives in the village and is illiterate and does not understand the legal requirements of such a claim he must miss out on making a claim. I am very conscious that he may be a rural person without any understanding of going to a lawyer and how to make a claim. But I am not saying that is most unfortunate and he must miss out, I am saying that because he has show no evidence of attempting to make any claim of any kind whether by custom or otherwise or by complaining to the owner of the vehicle then there is no good reason why the time allowed under the Act should be extended. I wonder why no relative or more influential person in his village did not make any move to seek customary compensation. Perhaps they knew the content of the police road accident report.

I must find that I have not been given any good reason why he should be granted an extension of time. I dismiss the application.

Lawyer for the Applicant: Henao Priestley.

Lawyer for the Respondent: Young & Williams.