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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
OS 512/95
EVARA HOREPA & 13 OS
-v-
RAPHAEL BANAKATO
and
GULF INTERIM PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
WAIGANI: SALIKA, J
07 June, 1996
Judgment
Constitutional Law - S.187 I (4) of Constitution which has now repealed - Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act 1995 - Whether Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act 1995 was enacted in contravention of the then s.187I(4) of the Constitution.
Constitutional Law - Application of Sch.1:17(1) of the Constitution s.187I(4) was complied with by the National Executive Council.
K. Naru for the Plaintiffs
S. Soi for the Defendants
07 June, 1996: The Plaintiffs by Originating Summons claim:
1. Moripi Local Government Council
2. Urama Gopera Local Government Council
3. Orokolo Local Government Council
4. Kotidanga Local Government Council
5. Kaipi Local Government Council
6. Kovio Local Government Council
7. Kouri Miri Local Government Council
8. Kikori Local Government Council
9. Baimuru Local Government Council
10. Kerema Bay Local Government Council
11. Toaripi Local Government Council
12. Kaintiba Local Government Council
13. Mailovera Local Government Council
14. Kerema Town Authority.
Presidents Local Government Council / Town Authority
1. Lari Ori Ivarapou - Moripi LGC
2. Haua Arugu - Urama Gopera LGC
3. George Hao Kilavi - Orokolo LGC
4. Augustine Tona - Kotidanga LGC
5. Eka Tarava - Kaipi LGC
6. Tony Kaia - Kovio LGC
7. Evara Horepa - Kouri Miri LGC
8. Eko Natai - Kikori LGC
9. Aua Akia - Baimuru LGC
10. Atune Elave - Kerema Bay LGC
11. Giamuki Kaugesa - Toarapi LGC
12. Hedu Kerekere - Kaintiba LGC
13. Falema Larivita - Mai Lovera LGC
14. Bill Avosa - Kerema Town Authority
FACTS
The following it seems to me are uncontested facts:-
(a) Premier Riddler Kimave’s letter to Acting Secretary for Gulf, Mr T. Maravila (back dated to 20 June 1995).
(b) Acting Secretary to Gulf, Mr T Maravila’s letter to Provincial Local Government Officer (back dated to 20 June 1995).
(c) Proclamation by provincial Minister for Local Government Council, Mr Raphael Banakato (back dated to 26 June 1995).
(I) Prime Minister’s Office;
(ii) Deputy Prime Minister;
(iii) Minister for Provincial Affairs;
THE LAW
The plaintiffs claim that the Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act 1995 was enacted in contravention of s.187I(4) of the Constitution and was therefore invalid. The Constitutional provision has since been repealed by Constitutional Amendments No 16 of 1995. The old provision of s.187I(4) reads:-
"Notwithstanding anything in any other law, a Local Government Council or a Local Government Special Purposes Authority in a province that has provincial government may be suspended or abolished only with the consent of the National Executive or the Parliament, and of the Provincial Executive or the provincial legislature".
The new Section 187 I of the Constitution as amended reads:-
"(I) Until an Organic Law makes provision for government at Local level; and such provision is implemented in accordance with the Organic Law the Local Government Act (Chapter 57), as in force from time to time, continues to apply in aspect of such government in the province.
(2) An Organic Law shall make provisions for the respective powers of the National government and of Provincial Government concerning local level Governments".
The Plaintiffs claim that their claim for relief is based on the operation for the repealed s.187I(4) of the Constitution in view of the fact that their rights, privileges and obligations the subject of this claim, existed and were acquired under the repealed provisions and the defendants action affected those rights, privileges and obligation under the repealed provision and in view of that, their right to seek relief is instituted under the repealed provision, as if the repealed provision had continued in force.
The plaintiffs also argued that their action is permitted by operation of Schedule 1.17 (1) of the constitution which reads:-
Sch. 1.17 REPEAL, etc.
(1) The repeal of a Constitutional Law or a part of a constitutional Law does not -
(a) revive anything (including a statute or any part of the underlying law) that was not in force or existing immediately before the repeal took effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of the repealed provisions or anything duly done or suffered under them; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed provisions; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of an offence committed against the repealed provisions; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and the penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealed provisions had continued in force.
No case authority was cited as this may be the first case to deal directly with this provision. Having heard counsel for the plaintiff address the court on the aspect of the matter I am satisfied that Schedule 1.17 (1) is applicable in this case. This is because as the facts suggest the plaintiffs were presidents and chairmen of the 13 Local Government Councils and the Kerema Town Authority in the Gulf Province. Their positions together with their rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities were governed by the repealed provision. The Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act 1995 was enacted during the life of the repealed provision of the constitution. When the Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act 1995 was passed it effectively removed the plaintiffs as presidents and chairman together with the rights the plaintiffs had acquired under the repealed s.187 I. Their action to seek any relief or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealed provision had continued in force. I find that the plaintiff are entitled to bring this action.
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
The plaintiffs claim that the passing of the Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act 1995 was in contravention of the repealed s.187 I (4) of the Constitution and therefore invalid. They claim that under provision if a Local Government council in a province that has a provincial government is to be suspended or abolished it can only be suspended or abolished with the consent of the NEC or the Parliament and the Provincial Executive Government or Provincial legislature. The defendants argue that the repealed s.187I(4) should be read to mean that where a provincial government intends to suspend or abolish a Local Government Council it may seek consent of the parliament or National Executive Council and provincial Executive Council or Provincial Assembly.
I am of the view that the correct meaning given to the repealed provision of s.187I(4) of the Constitution is as put by the plaintiffs.
I am in agreement with the contention then that if the Gulf Provincial Government had decided to abolish the Local Governments in the province it had to get the consent of the National Executive Council or the National Parliament and the Provincial Executive Council or the Provincial Assembly. It is agreed by the parties here that the consent of the Provincial Executive Council and the provincial Assembly were obtained. However the plaintiffs dispute that consent was obtained from the National Executive Council or the National Parliament. The defendants assert consent was obtained from the National Executive Council. It seems to me that the law does not provide the manner and form the consent is to be obtained. The defendants argue that given the facts that the Governor General had sworn the previous members of the Provincial Assembly into office as members of the Interim Gulf Provincial Assembly, it can be inferred that the National Executive Council had given its consent. That inference is made because the Governor General is deemed to have acted in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council.
The plaintiffs on the other had argue that the letter written by Mr Riddler Kimave the then Premier to the then Minister for Provincial Affairs and Local Government Mr Castan Maibawa on the 7 July 1995 was an attempt by Mr Kimave to get the consent of the National Executive Council to abolish the 13 Local Government Council and their presidents and the Kerema Town Authority.. The plaintiff argue that when the Minister wrote back to Mr Kimave and advised him that there were some legal and factual discrepancies surrounding the passing of the law, the Minister was in effect declining consent to the passing of the law to abolish the councils and the town authority.
The issue then is whether the National Executive Council consented to abolish the Local Government Councils in the Gulf Province as envisaged by the then s.187I(4) of the Constitution.
The evidence before me is that the then Minister for Provincial Affairs had advised that there were factual and procedural discrepancies leading to the passage of the Gulf Provincial Local Government (Amendment) Act. Can that communication be taken to mean that the National Executive Council had not consented to the passage of the Law? In the circumstances I cannot accept the Minister’s letter as that of the National Executive Council. The law then was that consent had to be obtained from the National Executive Council or the Parliament. How that consent was to be obtained was in my view a matter relating to the internal procedures of the Gulf Government and the National Executive Council which I have no power to question,
Should I then accept the proposition that as the Governor General had sworn the members as members of the Interim Gulf Provincial Government consent had been obtained from the National Execute Council? S.86(2) of the Constitution provides that the Head of State shall act only with and in accordance with the advise of the National Executive Council. s.86(4) provides that what (if any) advice was given to the Head of State by whom, is non-justiciable. It seems to me that I must accept the proposition that consent of the National Executive Council had been obtained by virtue of the actions of the Governor General to comply with the then S.187I(4) of the Constitution.
In the circumstances I dismiss the Originating Summons with costs.
Lawyer for the Plaintiff: Carter Newell
Lawyer for the Defendant: Soi & Associates
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/1996/100.html