National Court of Papua New Guinea

In the latter case, Woods J. made some remarks concerning the effect of a letter written by lawyer for a claimant addressed to the Trust merely enclosing the letter of extension of time by the Insurance Commissioner as in the present case. However, the issue did not arise and as Woods J indicated in his reasons for decision it was not necessary to decide the point in that case. The case is therefore not helpful.

The former case raises the issue of what is notice under s 54 (6) of the Act. In that case, Injia J. said:

“There are two requirements under s 54 (6). First, the claimant must give notice of claim to the Trust and second, such notice must be given within 6 months after the occurrence of which the claim arose or within such period as allowed by the Commission of the Courts. In relation to the first of these two requirements, the word ‘notice’ is not defined by the Act. There is also no pro-forma definition of a ‘notice’ prescribed by the Act. At the hearing I asked Counsel for the Trust what the statutory definition of ‘notice’ was and whether oral notice was sufficient under the Act. I put to him the hypothetical case of an old illiterate villager had just sustained an injury in a motor vehicle accident. He turns up at the Trust office, within the six months period, he tells the officers of the Trust that he wants to make a claim for compensation. He gives all the necessary details of the accident as best as he can and goes away. Would that be sufficient notice under s 54 (6)?.....

The above hypothetical case demonstrates the practical difficulties associated with a strict, technical, formalistic and legalistic approach to defining the word ‘notice’. It also shows the wider problem associated with interpreting our modern laws and institution which are intended for universal application to all citizens of our country in all its diversity in ethnicity and cultural and educational background. The bulk of our people are still illiterate and under the influence of traditional customs and values. They are ignorant of the strict and formalistic requirements of our modern laws and the rules of practice procedures which they entail and the institutions which they govern. In interpreting our laws, we must not forget the ordinary people. Laws must be liberally and fairly construed so as to achieve their intended purpose. Strict and legalistic approach to construction of words in a statute are a thing of the past: PLAR No. 1 of 1980 [1908] PNGLR 326, SCR No. 6 of 1984 [1985] PNGLR 31.

In my view, a notice under s 54 (6) should be accorded its ordinary meaning. It means to inform or to make the Trust aware of the claimant’s intention to make claim against it. The form the notice should take may vary depending on the circumstances which include the claimant's level of sophistication, geographical location and whether he is represented by a lawyer or a friend or relative. It may be orally or in writing. Whatever form the notice takes, it should sufficiently set out the relevant particulars of the motor vehicle accident, the nature of the injuries received and medical treatment received, if any, and the claimant’s desire or intention to make a claim.”

I am in general agreement with what Injia J. said in respect of what constitutes notice under s 54 with one exception. Where in a case a claimant has all the relevant details of the motor vehicle accident as well as the details of injuries and any medical treatment to hand, it would be helpful to give those details to the defendant in the notice of intention to make a claim. The essence of a notice is to inform the defendant that the claimant intends to make a claim. The notice of intention is not the claim itself and therefore need not contain the full details of the claim. A claimant may or may not have all the relevant details to support a claim when giving notice of intention to make a claim. If the details are not yet available, these can be provided when they are available.

The question in the present case is whether the defendant was given notice in accordance with s 54 (6) of the Act? Counsel for the plaintiff relies on letter written by Ray Vaea Lawyers dated 2^nd September 1996. The letter simply enclosed the extension granted by the Insurance Commissioner within which to file a notice of claim. The letter written by Ray Vaea Lawyers did not expressly say notice is given. However, absence of such words are not essential (see Injia J. in Stanley Tendi v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust (supra)). I find that the letter from the Insurance Commissioner made express reference to extension of time in which to make a claim. The letter written by Ray Vaea Lawyers enclosed the letter from the Insurance Commissioner and indicated that it was self-explanatory. This effectively meant that the Lawyers were giving notice to the defendant that they were giving notice to make a claim within the twenty eight days extension given by the Commissioner. Furthermore the letter made reference to providing the details of claim in the future. In my opinion, the letter constituted notice of intention to make claim against the defendant in all the circumstances.

I find that the defendant has been given notice in accordance with s 54 (6) of the Act and therefore the parties should proceed with the claim in accordance with the law. The plaintiff is to have the costs of this application.

Lawyers for the Plaintiff: Patterson Lawyers

Lawyers for the Defendant: Nii & Mirupasi