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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR NO 427 OF 2003
THE STATE
V
DANIEL RONALD WALUS
KIMBE: CANNINGS J
22, 25 FEBRUARY 2005
SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW – indictable offence – Criminal Code, Division V.2 (homicide etc) – Section 302 (manslaughter) – sentence on plea of guilty – sentencing guidelines – offender punched and kicked his wife’s cousin-sister on several occasions, inflicting fatal blows – no other person involved in attack – no other intervening cause of death – intention to do serious harm – offender angry with the victim who immediately prior to the incident had altercation with offender’s wife – no evidence of pre-existing condition of deceased making her susceptible to injury – vicious attack – prisoner did not surrender to police – cooperated with police – no evidence of doing anything tangible to remedy the wrong – not clear whether prisoner genuinely remorseful – not a youthful offender – starting point for head sentence – identification of relevant considerations – application of relevant considerations – whether appropriate to suspend whole or part of sentence – need for properly documented pre-sentence report – sentence of 18 years –10 years must be served – balance of 8 years may be suspended on application to the National Court.
Cases cited:
Anna Max Marangi v The State (2002) SC702
Antap Yala v The State (1996) unreported SCR 69/96
Jack Tanga v The State (1999) SC602
John Kapil Tapi v The State (2000) SC635
Rex Lialu v The State [1990] PNGLR 487
The State v Hiliong Gunaing CR No 1198 of 2004, 25.02.05, unreported
The State v Mark Kanupio and Others CR Nos 238-242 of 2003, 25.02.05,
unreported
Counsel:
F Popeu for the State
O Oiveka for the accused
CANNINGS J:
INTRODUCTION
This is a decision on the sentence for a man who pleaded guilty to the offence of unlawful killing, also known as manslaughter, committed against his wife’s cousin-sister.
BACKGROUND
Incident
The incident giving rise to the charge took place at Ponini Oil Palm settlement, West New Britain, on the morning of 23 October 2002. It was alleged that the accused punched and kicked his wife’s cousin-sister, causing her death.
Indictment
On 22 February 2005 he was brought before the National Court and faced the following indictment:
Daniel Ronald Walus of Salimun, Namatanai, New Ireland Province, stands charged that he on the 23rd day of October 2002 at Ponini settlement in Papua New Guinea unlawfully killed Julie Palap.
The indictment was presented under Section 302 of the Criminal Code.
FACTS
Allegations
The following allegations were put to the accused for the purpose of obtaining a plea.
On the morning of 23 October 2002 the accused’s wife had an altercation with the deceased over harvesting of cocoa beans. The accused’s wife assaulted the deceased and the deceased swore at the accused’s wife. The accused’s wife reported the matter to him. The accused then walked from his house to the deceased’s house. The deceased was sitting on the steps of her house. The accused came up the steps and punched her on the side of her face. This caused her to fall down. He then punched her on each side of her stomach. He kicked her in the ribs, while she was still on the ground. The deceased then urinated, passed faeces and vomited. She died shortly afterwards. The medical report showed that she died from a broken neck and ruptured spleen. This showed that when the deceased had fallen from the steps, she broke her neck. By kicking her the accused had caused her spleen to rupture. The accused therefore caused her death.
Conviction
The accused pleaded guilty to those facts. I entered a provisional plea of guilty and then, after reading the District Court depositions, confirmed the plea and convicted the accused. He is now referred to as the prisoner.
ANTECEDENTS
The prisoner has no prior convictions.
ALLOCUTUS
I administered the allocutus, ie the prisoner was given the opportunity to say what matters the court should take into account when deciding on punishment. A paraphrased summary of his response follows:
This is my first time to be in trouble. I did not intend to kill that lady. After I was captured for this trouble I had properties which were burned down. I also have my wife and my child to look after. I say sorry to the law and to the court for what I have done. I ask for the court’s mercy by putting me on a good behaviour bond or probation.
SUBMISSIONS BY DEFENCE COUNSEL
Mitigating factors
Mr Oiveka referred to a number of mitigating factors. The prisoner pleaded guilty, saving the trouble and expense of a trial. He is a first time offender, never having been in trouble with the law before. He has been a person of good character. He has expressed remorse. He regrets what he did. There was provocation in a non-legal sense as the incident arose from a domestic argument on an oil palm settlement.
Personal particulars
The prisoner is married with one child. He is originally from Namatanai. He is educated to grade 9.
Overall
He referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Anna Max Marangi v The State (2002) SC702, Jalina J, Injia J, Sawong J. A woman pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of a woman who she suspected was having an affair with her husband. The court reviewed the sentencing guidelines for uncontested manslaughter cases in a domestic setting and suggested that the following categories be used:
This case belongs to the first category, Mr Oiveka argued. Therefore the starting point for the head sentence is 3 to 7 years.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE STATE
Mr Popeu for the State submitted that the prisoner was guilty of a serious offence. The case fits into the second Marangi category. The incident took place in the presence of the deceased’s parents. That is an aggravating factor. Compensation cannot be taken into account as after the prisoner gave the deceased’s family K2,000.00, it was taken back.
RELEVANT LAW
The crime of manslaughter
Section 302 of the Criminal Code states:
A person who unlawfully kills another under such circumstances as not to constitute wilful murder, murder or infanticide is guilty of manslaughter.
Penalty: Subject to Section 19, imprisonment for life.
Maximum penalty
I am satisfied that the elements of the offence of manslaughter were adequately set out in the indictment, that the prisoner was aware of their significance and that the summary of the facts pleaded to by the prisoner supported those elements.
The prisoner is therefore liable to a penalty of imprisonment for life.
Discretion
That is the maximum penalty. The court has a considerable discretion whether to impose the maximum penalty by virtue of Section 19 of the Criminal Code. For example:
DECISION MAKING PROCESS
To determine the appropriate penalty I will adopt the following decision making process:
STEP 1 - WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE HEAD SENTENCE?
Approach
In setting an appropriate head sentence I will take this approach:
Starting point
I accept that the starting point for working out the head sentence should be identified by considering Marangi’s case. It was a case where the unlawful killing occurred in a domestic setting, ie there was a dispute of some sort between the offender and the deceased.
In Marangi the court noted that historically manslaughter cases occurring in the home tended to attract lower sentences. But that has changed, particularly since the Supreme Court’s decision in Antap Yala v The State (1996) unreported SCR 69/96, Amet CJ, Salika J, Injia J, where the view was strongly expressed that the National Court had been too lenient on sentencing for manslaughter in a domestic setting.
The present case, I consider, falls into the second category. I reject Mr Oiveka’s submission that it fits into the first category. This was not an uncalculated attack. The evidence suggests clearly that the prisoner went after the deceased, evidently in a fit of rage. He found her, then beat her to death with his fists and his feet. The second category deals with repeated application of vicious force, with or without a weapon (here it was without), eg repeated kicks or punches (here there was both).
This was a savage, violent attack by a man on a woman. It is fair to use the concept of a starting point and I will adopt the point which is in the top of the range, ie 12 years.
Relevant considerations
I will now set out the things I consider should be taken into account when determining whether to increase or decrease the head sentence or leave it at the starting point. In arriving at this list I have considered previous manslaughter cases decided by the Supreme Court, including Rex Lialu v The State [1990] PNGLR 487, Kapi DCJ, Hinchliffe J, Jalina J; Jack Tanga v The State (1999) SC602, Jalina J, Injia J, Kirriwom J; John Kapil Tapi v The State (2000) SC635, Kapi DCJ, Injia J, Sawong J; as well as Marangi and Yala. I have also considered two other manslaughter cases, each involving a plea of guilty, I have dealt with this month in Kimbe: The State v Mark Kanupio and Others CR Nos 238-242 of 2003, 25.02.05, unreported and The State v Hiliong Gunaing CR No 1198 of 2004, 25.02.05, unreported.
The relevant considerations are:
Rationale
The above considerations have been drafted so that an affirmative (yes) answer to any one can be regarded as a mitigating factor, a negative (no) answer will be an aggravating factor and a neutral answer will be a neutral factor. The more mitigating factors that are present, the more likely it is that the head sentence will be reduced. The more aggravating factors present, the more likely it is that the head sentence will be lifted above the starting point. However, sentencing is not an exact science. It is a discretionary process. When a factor is marked as mitigating or aggravating it does not mean necessarily that it is given the same weight as another mitigating or aggravating factor. Some mitigating factors may be ‘strongly mitigating’. Others may be ‘mildly mitigating’. The same goes for aggravating factors.
Another thing to note is that there are, in general, three sorts of considerations listed.
Numbers 1 to 9 focus on the circumstances of the incident that led to the death. All manslaughter cases are bad. The death that has occurred is invariably unnecessary and tragic. But the circumstances of each incident are different. Some are worse than others. These considerations are intended to capture the circumstances of the incident.
Numbers 10 to 14 focus on what the offender has done since the incident and how he has conducted himself.
Numbers 15 to 17 look at the personal circumstances of the offender and give an opportunity to take into account any other factors not previously considered. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Lialu a list of considerations or sentencing criteria of this sort is not meant to be exhaustive.
Application of considerations
I apply the above considerations to each prisoner as follows
I regard consideration Nos 1, 4, 5, 8 and 9 and 14 as serious aggravating factors. This attack was extremely vicious, unnecessary and cowardly. It takes the case beyond the range suggested in Marangi. This is a case where elements of the crime of murder appear to exist. He has not been charged with murder. But it is a very serious manslaughter case and in the absence of mitigating factors, the head sentence I consider could have been 25 years imprisonment. That would have been above the suggested range in Marangi. But the court stated in Marangi that its categories were guidelines only and in an appropriate case the penalties could be higher.
There are some mitigating factors: those numbered 11, 13 and 15. He co-operated with the police and he pleaded guilty.
The other considerations I have not specifically mentioned here are those that are neutral (No 7) or those I think are neither significantly aggravating nor significantly mitigating (Nos 2, 3, 6, 10, 12, 16, 17).
Taking all the above considerations into account and comparing this case with the sentences in the previous cases referred to, the head sentence is 18 years imprisonment.
STEP 2 - SHOULD ALL OR PART OF THE HEAD SENTENCES BE SUSPENDED?
Request
This is a case where it did not seem appropriate to consider suspending part of the sentence, given the circumstances in which the offence was committed, particularly the violence. However, to help me make a decision on this issue I requested and received a pre-sentence report under Section 13(2) of the Probation Act in relation to the prisoner. The report was prepared by the Kimbe office of the Community Correction and Rehabilitation Service.
Report
According to the report the prisoner resides in a Stettin Bay Lumber Company (SBLC) house, near Kimbe. He is aged 28 and has a wife and child. They live with him. He is also accommodating seven other relatives, all children. He is happy with his living situation but will later consider returning to New Ireland. He lives close to his in-laws and they have a healthy relationship. He regularly contacts his family at home and they have assisted him with K2,000.00 to compensate the parents and relatives of the deceased. He views his marriage as a steady one. This was confirmed by his wife, who comes from Bundu, Morobe. She loves him and is committed to assist him in compensating the parents of the victim. She does not want him to be given a custodial sentence. If he is given a non-custodial sentence they can help each other find money to meet the amount of K15,000.00 demanded by the deceased’s family. His absence from the family is likely to create problems and she and their child will suffer.
The report leaves open the question of whether the prisoner is a suitable candidate for probation. This appears to be a reflection of the seriousness of the crime that was committed.
Assessment of report
I cannot find anything in the report to justify a non-custodial sentence. Clearly the deceased’s relatives are still very upset over the death of the deceased. This is an extreme and tragic case of violence in a domestic setting. I cannot be satisfied that the prisoner is not a danger to the community or a danger to those he lives with. Suspending the sentence immediately would tend to condone this sort of behaviour by men against women. In a civilised society brutal attacks of this nature upon defenceless women are unacceptable.
Qualified sentence
I will nonetheless qualify the prison sentence by ordering that it can be suspended, after the prisoner has served a minimum term of imprisonment, if before the expiration of the term prescribed, the National Court approves a post-release parole period with strict conditions attached.
The conditions that I envisage would be suitable are, for example, that the prisoner do some strictly controlled community work; that he submit to regular counselling with an officially recognised and reputable local church or other place of religious worship; that his movements be restricted; that he refrain from consuming drugs; that he be of impeccable behaviour. The issue of compensation could also be addressed. Proof of genuine steps towards peace and reconciliation between the prisoner and the relatives of the deceased would be viewed favourably.
The prisoner will be at liberty to, at any time, make an application to vary the sentence so as to suspend the remaining part of the term of imprisonment.
Step 3
Step 3 of the sentencing process, referred to above, will not be considered at this stage.
SENTENCE
The court makes the following order:
2 For the avoidance of doubt:
(a) the suspension of the above sentence will only come into effect if and when ordered by the National Court; and
(b) there shall be deducted from the term of imprisonment the period in custody that the prisoner has already spent in relation to this offence.
Sentenced accordingly.
__________________________________________________
Lawyers for the State : Public Prosecutor
Lawyers for the accused : Public Solicitor
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