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State v Hapot (No 2) [2016] PGNC 253; N6452 (20 April 2016)

N6452

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR. Nos. 915-917 OF 2013

THE STATE

V

ALPHONSE HAPOT
Lorengau: Kirriwom J
2016: 20^th April

(NO.2)

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – wilful murder – Criminal Code s 299 – wilful murder of an adult female aged 28 years and two female children aged 10 years and eight years – mother and daughters – necks slashed through and other stab wounds – oesophagus and all major blood vessels to the brain severed – two received blunt object wounds to the head peeling the outer layer of skin from the skull – bodies thrown into the sea – offender 27-28 years old – apparent revenge attack for rejection of sexual advances – sentences of 60 years in hard labour and two sentences of penalty of death.

Facts

The offender, a villager aged 27 or 28, was convicted of killing a 28 year old mother and her two daughters aged 8 years and 10 years, apparently in retaliation for the mother’s rejection of his sexual advances. All three had their neck savagely cut so that the oesophagus and all of the blood vessels to the brain were severed. There were also stab wounds to the bodies and two had blunt force trauma wounds to the head peeling the skin away from the skull.

Held

1. The case is similar to the case of The State v Simbu (No 2) (2004) N2548, at [24];
   
2. Using the yard stick proposed in Ume’s Case , this case quite clearly satisfies the requirement for death-penalty punishment, firstly, two innocent children are brutally murdered, secondly because the motive for the killing was a obsession with sex with the deceased mother and thirdly because of the merciless killing of three people, at [32];
   
3. Despite judicial recommendations for the amendment of the Parole Act over 20 years so that, the courts can have power to prescribe minimum periods of imprisonment, the Act remains unamended, at [36-37];
   
4. The sentencing authority has to take into account the effect of the Correctional Services Act reduction of sentence by one third, when passing sentence so that the prisoner serves an appropriate period in prison, at [39-40];
   
5. The prisoner is sentenced (1) for the wilful murder of Brenda Ben to 60 years imprisonment in hard labour; (2) for the wilful murder of Bernadette Ben the maximum penalty of death; (3) for the wilful murder of Benita Ben the maximum penalty of death;
   
6. The penalties of death are to be executed after the appeal period of 40 days has lapsed.

Case cited:
Loke Ume, Charles Patrick Kaona& Greg Wawa Kavoa v The State (2006) SC836
Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789
The State v Tonias Kurus (2014) N5652
UreHane v The State [1984] PNGLR 605

Counsel:

P Kaluwin, for the State

P Moses, for the Prisoner

JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE

20^th April, 2016;

1. KIRRIWOM, J: On 29 September 2015 on the evidence of your own fellow islanders of Mal and nearby islands of Amik and Pateku some of whom are persons closely related to you by blood such as Nick Kepis, you were found guilty and convicted of wilfully murdering Brenda Ben, adult female aged 28 years old, Bernadette Ben, child age 10 years old and Benita Ben, a child aged 8 years old. Those witnesses were Philip Sapak, Nick Kepis, Trevor Ben, Cecilia Trevor, Ben Andreas and Richard Mangiel. It was their evidence that convinced me beyond reasonable doubt that you killed Brenda Ben, Bernadette Ben and Benita Ben.

2. I did not place much emphasis on the medical reports compiled by or on behalf of Kiripai Maibi Papi CHW of Mal Health Centre in respect of the three deceased as the author of the report chose not to present himself in court as it was contended that he did not do a thorough examination of the bodies. Be that as it may, the reports appear to be consistent with the description of wounds and injuries recounted on the three bodies by Ben Andreas, as he discovered the bodies in the sea. The nature of injuries found following physical examination of the deceased are as follows:

3. The common injury amongst all three victims of your massacre is that you had their necks slashed with a very sharp weapon completely severing the oesophagus and the major blood vessels leading to the brain. And for Brenda and Bernadette you further stabbed them with a sharp object that left two or more penetrating wounds in their abdomens and also for Brenda and Benita you also smashed their heads with a blunt object that peeled off the outer layer of the skin covering the skull. These are descriptions of injuries observed by the husband and father of the mother and two children you murdered and recorded by CHW on the island were based on external examinations of the bodies only. However, if thorough examination was done by a qualified doctor, both internal and external, no doubt more excruciating details would have been revealed.

4. You may have had a reason or reasons for killing Brenda Ben, but I am still trying to understand or reason why you would kill two harmless and innocent children like Bernadette and Benita in the same brutal and grotesque manner as you slaughtered their mother. These two harmless and innocent children did you no harm, they caused you no pain, and they have no bad feelings about or bad relationship with you.

5. The only reason you could have killed these two children is to conceal evidence of your crimes after you raped and killed their mother or killed their mother and raped her afterwards, whichever of the two appealed to you, only you know. In view of all the signs on the body of Brenda Ben, her torn clothing just barely hanging on her body when found, her shorts and panties pushed right down to her ankles and found lying dead semi-naked, this clearly showed that the motive for this killing was sex driven revenge. This evidence provided the motive for the killing which was sex and that motive then led the search for the killer to you. From the evidence given by Andreas Ben, Trevor Ben and Richard Mangiel only you had that obsession to have sex with Brenda but she rejected and refused your persistent efforts and you had reason to be angry with her. And you did warn her in your last encounter with her when she scolded you. And you said to her “one good time you will know me”. 6. And that one good time availed itself to you on that Sunday 20 January 2013 when you saw Brenda and her two daughters Bernadette and Benita returning from Puihipi where they had gone to sell their lalai on that isolated stretch of the island. How you killed them one by one is beyond human comprehension. The way these execution type killings were carried out is like you set up an ambush in that secluded part of the island and waited for them to return. As they did you carried out your massacre of the family. You slaughtered them like wild beasts by cutting off their necks and then stabbing their bodies multiple times. Then you threw their bodies in the sea. That good time you promised Brenda had finally come for you and you fulfilled your promise, you had your revenge.

6. This opportunity opened up to you according to your own conversation with your various relatives after the killings of the three members of Ben family of Salehiak. When spreading the news of death of the three that same evening, you told Philip Sapakat Amik Is that you also went to Puihipi that afternoon to buy newspaper for your parents. That afternoon when the three bodies were found and brought to Salehiak past your parents place to Ben Andreas’s father’s area, while questions were flying left right and centre by relatives asking where these bodies were found, you volunteered from the shore that the bodies were discovered in the same location where you had carved and pulled or pushed your canoe out from the bush into the sea. Nobody asked you for an answer and how did you know if you were not with those men who discovered and retrieved the bodies from the sea and took them home?

7. You further gave yourself away when you answered an open challenge made by Trevor Ben saying ‘whoever did this has grudges against my family’ by coming up from behind and shaking hands with Trevor you said to him “sorry it was not me”. Why would you do this or say this to Trevor if you did not do this, if you were innocent and had no knowledge about this? You were not accused by anyone and that open challenge was not implied for you.

8. And the more damaging evidence against you, the one that closed the lid on the coffin and ensured that you cannot escape, no matter what, was your own admission to Nick Kepis. On the fourth day after the killings when the villagers from nearby islands were there to help bury the mother and her two daughters by building coffins and laying canvas, you were in your house alone nursing your swollen hand or knuckles. When Nick asked you several times if you were responsible for the killings, you bowed your head and told him you did. Nick Kepis is a close relation to you. You gave me no reason for Nick Kepis making up this story to get you into trouble for nothing. Families always stick together, through thick and thin, and protect each other in good time and bad time. You gave me no good reason for Nick Kepis to be coming out of this family bondage and revealing a secret that you shared with him that by law he is obliged to disclose to the relevant authorities. And he has done that.

Ben Casper

9. This witness is a serial liar. The only truth in his evidence is where he saw blood on the road and relayed that information to Andreas Ben. That is the only truth in his story. All that story about seeing you attacking and killing the mother and her two daughters were manufactured by Police and planted in his mouth. Because it completely defies logic and common sense for Ben Casper to watch all that ruthless and barbaric slaughter of the mother and her two daughters taking place right in front of his eyes and he cannot even stop it or run back to Puihipi to seek help. And worst still and it further defies common sense and logic is that after witnessing all those atrocities unfolding in front of him, he leisurely continues his journey to Lewaleu climbs a betel nut tree and reaches Andreas Ben at Lewaleu. He gives no impression of having just witnessed the brutal slayings of Ben’s wife and daughters. Instead he gives some betel nuts to Ben and then as if by an after-thought he asks for his wife and the two daughters. It is only when Ben tells him that they had not yet returned, and then he tells him of some blood drops he saw on the road and suggested that they go look for them in case one of them had an accident along the way.

10. Ben Casper’s story that he came up with while in custody at Lorengau Police Cells either to buy his way out of being the main suspect in the triple murders or because he was forced by the Police who planted this story in his mouth for want of evidence to secure conviction, is a false story that is unbelievable and must not be believed.

11. I want the new PPC and PSC here in Manus to investigate this witness Ben Casper and the lies he told with a view to charging him with perjury as well as investigate the policemen implicated with Ben Casper in concocting this story.

Personal Particulars

12. On allocatus you maintained your innocence but pleaded for mercy of the court. You asked the court to not send you away to serve your sentence in another part of the country.

13. You are a young man, 27-28 years old and come from a very large family. You are the second born in the family of 5 girls and 7 boys. Your mother is from Bipi and your father is from Mal Is. He is the only police reservist on the island, a position he held for over 20 years on the island. You completed Grade 8 at Similan Primary School on Mal Is and have never been out of the Province except for a short 3 months stint in Lae in search for job and you returned home. You are married to Maryanne and you both have no children. I note that you worship in the Catholic Church.

14. Your lawyer submits that you have no criminal records; this is your first offence against the law. He submits that I must not impose the maximum penalty of death. He says death penalty is not mandatory and therefore I have discretion to impose a punishment other than the maximum death penalty.

15. Mr Kaluwin the Public Prosecutor seeks the maximum penalty of death for you in this case. Failing that, in the alternative he submits, that you be sentenced to sixty years on each count to be served concurrently. He is not asking for the second highest penalty which is life imprisonment. And his preference for a determinate term of imprisonment is probably grounded in my reasoning in the judgment I delivered in Wewak last year which I discuss below.

16. Mr Kaluwin’s alternative submission on penalty is consistent with my judgment in The State v Tonias Kurus (2014) N5652 (6/6/2014) where I imposed a sentence of 60 years on a young Maprik boy who raped a 15 year old female victim in the bush as she was fetching water and in fear of being reported by her to her father, he cut her neck with bush knife and later chopped and sliced up some parts of her body to pieces. I gave detailed reasons for that sentence and I don’t know if it has already gone through the scrutiny of the Supreme Court. As far as I am concerned, that sentence is not a quantum leap. It is time that we take a serious view of the sentences we impose as punishment and ask whether they are having their desired effect on law breakers.

17. I reminded Mr Kaluwin of the decision of Sevua J in The State v Thomas Waim [1995] PNGLR 187 one of the worst cases of rape to come before the court on its facts that in sentencing the prisoner on four counts of rape his honour made one final recommendation in the very last sentence of his judgment, that the prisoner must not be released on parole. Delivering its decision following appeal on severity of sentence of 25 years in Thomas Waim v The State(1997) SC519 (2/5/1997)the Supreme Court disapproved that statement in the final passage of its judgment with these words:“In addition we would quash the learned trial judge's recommendation that the appellant should not be released on parole, on the basis that there is presently no power to make such a recommendation.”

18. Integrity of the sentences imposed by the superior courts need to be respected and protected. That is all the judge was trying to achieve except that he usurped the power of the legislature. But time has come to remedy this vacuum immediately with respect.

19. In The State v Arua Maraga Hariki (2003) N2332 (3 February 2003) the prisoner was found guilty of wilfully murdering two young boys with whom he was drinking that evening. There were four of them, one was asleep in the car and three of them were drinking. For some reason or other the prisoner grabbed the deceased by his neck and as he struggled for air, he refused to let go until the boy died of suffocation. After seeing the prisoner kill their friend the other person ran away and saved his own life. He later gave evidence in court that convicted the prisoner. The boy who was sleeping in the car was also later found dead and both their bodies were dumped along the Papa-Lealea Road.

20. Salika J imposed a life sentence for the wilful murder of the boy who was strangled by the prisoner. As for the wilful murder of the boy who was fast asleep in the car, there was no reason to kill him and he sentenced the prisoner to death. I do not know if this case had gone through Supreme Court appeal and whatever the outcome is.

21. The above case reflects heedless taking away of precious human lives in bizarre and gruesome fashion with no respect for the sanctity of human life.

22. Factually, your case to an extent is similar to the case of The State-v-Ben Simakot Simbu (N0.2) (2004) N2548 where a death sentence was imposed on the prisoner who killed a mother and also her 2 year old son when the woman refused to allow him one chicken on credit.

23. Another case where the death penalty was imposed but went on appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against conviction, but upheld the appeal against the death penalty sentence and reduced the sentence of the appellants to life imprisonment for all of prisoners life is that of Steven Loke Ume, Charles Patrick Kaona & Greg Wawa Kavoa v The State (2006) SC836 (19 May 2006).This is a five-Judge bench decision of the Supreme Court on death-penalty appeal which surprisingly had not found its way into print in the 2006 volumes 1 and 2 of Papua New Guinea Law Reports. The Law Reporting Council may have had its reason for not including this judgment in the Law Reports.

24. Be that as it may, the facts of the case are that on 2 December 1995 there was a confrontation amongst the village people at Pagalau village during which a Patrick Reu was killed. People suspected Francis Reu of killing him and decided to take revenge. They conducted a search in the village for Francis and went to his house but did not find him there. Only his mother late Agnes Banovo was there. They asked her for Francis. When she could not tell them, they abducted her and “brutally assaulted her by raping her and then chopped her so viciously that she died”. The three appellants were identified amongst the 9 men who attacked and killed her. The trial judge found the killing to be the worst type of wilful murder and sentenced each appellant to death.

25. In that case the Supreme Court considered the question whether the penalty of death prescribed by s299 (2) was mandatory or discretionary. And the section reads:

“299. Wilful murder.

(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Code, a person who unlawfully kills another person, intending to cause his death or that of some other person, is guilty of wilful murder.

(2) A person who commits wilful murder shall be liable to be sentenced to death.”

26. The Supreme Court concluded that section 299(2) read on its own and in conjunction with section 19(1) (aa) shows clearly that the death penalty is discretionary. This being the case my sentencing power in this case remains unaffected.

27. The Supreme Court in Ume’s case also noted when reviewing the historical background of the death penalty in Papua New Guinea from the time of its introduction since 1907 that there was only one reported case of a ‘native’ being executed by hanging under this provision: see Sir Hubert Murray’s speech in 1924 reported in “Papua of Today’ quoted by Prentice J in Regina v Peter Ivoro [1971-72] PNGLR 374.

28. The Supreme Court noted the significance of the death penalty and when it is appropriate:

“45. The death penalty being the maximum punishment for wilful murder is reserved for the worst case of its kind. The facts of each case will of course be different and the punishment for each case is to be determined on its own facts. In considering the appropriateness of the death penalty in a particular case, there are many relevant factors and considerations under the different heads mentioned above to be taken into account and it is not possible to list them all. Some relevant considerations are the position of the victim, the capacity of the offender, the reasons or motive for the crime, the modus operandi and the expression of genuine remorse after the killing.

46. Further, because the death penalty is the ultimate penalty under the Criminal Code, the Court should not restrict its consideration of relevant factors to the factual circumstances of the case and the offender’s personal circumstances. It should also consider other relevant matters such as community concerns over prevalence of violent crimes and the need for strong deterrent and punitive sentence, public or private morality concerns, customary beliefs and values of both the deceased and offender’s customary groups which influence the killing and the views of the victim’s relatives.”

29. In an attempt to assist the trial judges in dealing with some of these most gruesome murders committed in this country by everyday people with no respect for human lives and to lay some sort of guidelines similar to that recommended in Ure Hane v The State [1984] PNGLR 605 per Bredmeyer, J, the Supreme Court made this observation:

“66. It is difficult to lay down any universal principle of general application as to the kind of intentional killing which may warrant the death penalty. Each case will depend on its own facts. In general, considering that the death penalty is “qualitatively different” from any other penalties for wilful murder and that in our Criminal Code the death penalty is limited to only three crimes considered to be the most serious crimes, we consider the death penalty may be considered appropriate in a wilful murder case which is pre-meditated, vicious and brutal killing in cold blood of an innocent and defenceless or harmless person, or a person in authority or position of responsibility in the community, with complete and blatant disregard for the sanctity of human life and for which there is no motive or lawful motive for taking away the life of another person. The killing is unthinkable, “conscious less”, “senseless”, “pitiless” and “unnecessarily torturous”: see Profitt v Florida 428 US 249 at 255. The crime is committed “by persistent, violent, wicked-tempered man with the utmost ferocity and with cunning”. Regina v Peter Ivoro, per Prentice J, at p.388-389.The offender’s culpability is so grave that the offender deserves execution. Whatever the extenuating and mitigating circumstances may be, the degree of moral and criminal culpability and the degree of cruelty exhibited by the offender is so grave and reprehensible that the offender is undeserving of a chance to live his own life, and instead, it is only just and fair that the prisoner should pay for the crime with his own life. His banishment from the community is the only just and appropriate punishment for his crime in all the circumstances.

67. In our view, given the English experience and in particular the United States experience, the Parliament may wish to consider prescribing the types of aggravating circumstances in wilful murder cases which warrant the death penalty. It may also consider prescribing mitigating circumstances or perhaps re-introducing the “extenuating circumstances” provision. In the absence of such legislation, we would suggest the death penalty may be considered appropriate in the following types of cases:-

1. The killing of a child, a young or old person, or a person under some disability needing protection.
   
2. The killing of a person in authority or responsibility in the community providing invaluable community service, whether for free or for fee who are killed in the course of carrying out their duties or for reasons to do with the performance of their duties e.g. policeman, correctional officer, government officer, school teacher, church worker, company director or manager.
   
3. Killing of a leader in government or the community, for political reasons.
   
4. Killing of person in the course of committing other crimes perpetrated on the victim or other persons such as rape, robbery, theft, etc.
   
5. Killing for hire.
   
6. Killing of two or more persons in the single act or series of acts.
7. Offence is committed by a prisoner in detention or custody serving sentence for another serious offence of violence.
   
8. The prisoner has prior conviction(s) for murder offences.
   

30. Using the yardstick proposed by the Supreme Court in Ume’s case, this case quite clearly satisfies the requirement for death penalty punishment by several significant factors, namely, firstly, two innocent children are brutally and mercilessly stabbed multiple times and their necks cut and bodies thrown into the sea for no apparent reason and secondly, because the motive for this killing is your obsession for sex with the deceased, Brenda Ben was murdered after being raped or raped after being murdered as you had promised that one good time she (Brenda)will come to regret this and evidence of torn clothing and semi-naked body of the deceased clearly demonstrate this. And thirdly, in this single incident you mercilessly killed three people, a mother and her two daughters.

31. Considering the bizarre circumstances of the case there is no better punishment for you than the sentence of death. Because this a is a worst case of wilful murder to ever cross my whole life of nineteen years of serving on the bench as a Judge, I have no qualms or regret in stating that you deserve nothing less than the death penalty for these three cold blooded murders. This is a case that only death penalty can do justice to the family of the deceased mother and her two daughters. It is a worst case of wilful murder to ever confront any sensible human soul on earth, particularly in the small island communities of Hermit, Ninigo and Western Group of islands. When one man single-handedly kills three people in such horrendous, brutal, bizarre and cold-blooded fashion, without the slightest hesitation and remains indifferent amongst other peace loving people, it is indicative of someone with a schizophrenic personality. If he has compulsion to kill in this fashion and live, he will no doubt kill again. Therefore the only appropriate punishment for him is the death sentence.

32. My only misgivings about the highest penalty of death is that this sentencing option has become highly controversial in recent times and there is an on-going debate on whether we should retain it or reject it, as such there is now a big question mark concerning its implementation. If the death sentence option is finally scrapped from our laws, all those prisoners currently on death rows will be placed in the level of the next highest punishment which is imprisonment for life. However, I hear the Supreme Court loud and clear in Ume’s case that, it is not for me to concern myself with the future of the death penalty or what is going on in the Parliament with the legislation on the enforcement mechanism. As long as the penalty is provided by law and it is the law in force, judges like me are bound to apply the law as it is.
    
33. Imprisonment for life is not my preferred option for a most dangerous criminal. And this prisoner is in my view a most dangerous criminal. This highest penalty of life imprisonment is not free of early release options. A life termer has the chance to walk out of prison on parole after serving a minimum of fifteen years if his behaviour in prison has been good all the time. The courts have no power to compel the corrections authorities to keep a prisoner beyond a minimum period of time which is one third of his sentence to become eligible for parole because the Parole Act does not give such power to the courts. For example a prisoner sentenced to 18 years can go out on parole after serving a minimum six years in prison.
    
34. Over twenty years ago while wearing the hat of the Chairman of the newly established Parole Board of Papua New Guinea I recommended amongst other things for the Parole Act to be amended and sentencing authorities (ie the Courts) to be given power to prescribe minimum periods that prisoners must serve before their parole eligibility is due. Now, after nineteen years on the bench since leaving that office, I am finding myself in the same wanting position like those judges who expressed similar views twenty years ago. And here I am pinching myself, what happened to my recommendation to the Attorney General to amend the Parole Act?
    
35. In my considered opinion, if the maximum penalty of life must have the impact that a sentencing authority intends or desires that a sentence must have on the prisoner, then the minimum period to be served before he can be considered for parole eligibility must be increased or removed altogether. And furthermore, there must be a general provision for the sentencing authority to prescribe a minimum sentence in years to be served before a prisoner becomes eligible for parole. This has to happen quickly because one judge tried a radical approach, only to be shot down by the Supreme Court: see Thomas Waim v The State (supra).
    
36. I raised this very issue in The State v Tonias Kurus (2014) N5652 (6/6/2014) because I felt that falling short of death penalty, I would like to see this offender serve a substantial term of his sentence in prison, not hijacked by an early release program that has no regard or concerns underpinning the reasons for sentencing of the prisoner concerned to such a long term of incarceration.
    
37. It is for this reason, notwithstanding the sentencing guidelines in Manu Kovi v The State(2005) SC789, where it comes to imposing the maximum penalty possible, I prefer fixed or determinate terms to indeterminate terms because using simple arithmetic calculations of one third to know the minimum period to be served for parole eligibility of a prisoner, the sentencing authority knows how long the prisoner is going to serve before parole catches up with him. For example, if I impose a prison term of 60 years, I know that with one third remissions taken off that prisoner’s sentence the moment he enters the institution under the Correctional Services Act (which is 20 years of his sentence taken off), he is going to serve 40 years in prison, if he does not opt for parole and if he maintains a clean record in his behaviour, and then discharged. However, if I sentence him to 60 years and he opts for parole after serving one third of his 60 years, he must serve at least or a minimum of 20 years in prison, before he can be released to serve the rest of 40 years outside the prison.
    
38. As a sentencing authority, must I not consider these factors when imposing a sentence on a dangerous offender with a terrible criminal record or history? That to me is being responsible and proactive in ensuring that court decisions are made with a view to having responsible outcomes not just mere blanket rhetoric and delivered in abstract. There is purpose in sending wrongdoers to prison.
    
39. In all the circumstances of this case, having said all that I have to say, bearing in mind the gravity of the crimes committed, the sentences the Court imposes on the prisoner are these:

(1) for wilfully murdering Brenda Ben, the sentence of the court is 60 years imprisonment in hard labour that the prisoner is to serve.

(2) for wilfully murdering Bernadette Ben, the sentence of the court is the maximum penalty of death which the court imposes on the prisoner.

(3) for wilfully murdering Benita Ben, the sentence of the court is the maximum penalty of death which the court also imposes on the prisoner.

40. As I stated at the outset of my judgment, you may have had a reason to kill Brenda Ben which is also not justified by law, but I cannot fathom why you had to kill to two innocent, harmless and defenceless children who caused you no harm. When I examine the entire circumstances of these triple cold blooded and merciless killings of the mother and her two daughters, in my judgment your culpability is so grave that you deserve execution. There have been no extenuating and mitigating circumstances demonstrated by you seeking leniency, the degree of your moral and criminal culpability and the degree of cruelty exhibited by you in the circumstances is so grave and reprehensible that you are undeserving of a chance to live your own life. It is instead, only just and fair that you should pay for these heinous crimes of triple wilful murders with your own life. Your banishment from the community is the only just and appropriate punishment for your crimes in all the circumstances.
    
41. Sentence of the court is 60 years, death penalty and death penalty.
    
42. The penalties of death are to be executed after the appeal period of 40 days has lapsed.
    
43. Warrant of Commitment is now issued for the prisoner’s incarceration in the Maximum Security Unit at Bomana Prison. CS Lorengau must now take immediate measures to arrange for the prisoner’s transfer to Bomana.

Public Prosecutor : Lawyer for the State

Public Solicitor : Lawyer for the Defence